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AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONTRACT 
SUPPORT PLANNING DOCTRINE 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this project is to analyze Operational Contract Support (OCS) 
planning doctrine for maturity and applicability to single services. In the OCS Initial 
Capabilities Document, the Department of Defense declared OCS a core defense 
capability. Service components are participating in numerous initiatives to institutionalize 
this function through the creation of resources spanning doctrine, organization, training, 
material, leadership, education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P). This 
project argues for the balanced development of OCS planning acquisition and non-
acquisition focused resources to effectively integrate this function across disciplines.  
The project analyzes Joint and Army current Operational Contract Support 
planning doctrine for maturity using a hybrid of E. Cory Yoder’s Three Integrative Pillars 
for Success and Dr. René Rendon’s Contract Management Maturity Model. Next, the 
project analyzes the execution of OCS and contingency contracting during Army and 
Combatant Command readiness exercises using E. Cory Yoder’s Three-Tier Model. The 
analysis revealed Joint level OCS planning resources are higher in maturity than 
operational level resources. The author recommends establishing immaterial planning 
activities and common vocabulary linking inorganic acquisition and non-acquisition 
entities.. Also, that future contingency contracting planning guidance developed is 
appropriate for initial entry operations applicable to various levels of theater maturity. 
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One of the most significant and oft repeated lessons of World War II was 
that the combatant commander must have control of his logistic support in 
order that his logistics might always be responsive to his combat needs. 
(Eccles, 1959, p. 224) 
A. BACKGROUND 
Throughout United States military history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
consistently relied on contracting with commercial sources to fulfill capability gaps and 
support an operational commander’s mission. Today’s military, having recently closed 
two major stability operations, finds a changing pattern of global threats and conflicts that 
require a different operational focus. New strategies in this unpredictable environment 
include rapid adaptation to threats and maintaining an agile global response force, which 
is a contrast to the large ongoing stability operations of the last decade (Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2015b). In contracting with commercial sources for these 
efforts, DOD agencies rely on lessons learned and planning phase operations to prepare 
for these new contingencies while executing force reduction plans.  
Contingency contracting is defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1.02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “the process of obtaining  
goods, services, and construction (from commercial sources) via contracting means in 
support of contingency operations” (CJCS, 2015a, p. 48). A declared contingency 
operation is defined by the acquisition focused Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), 
section 2.102 as 
A military operation that: 
(1) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military 
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or 




(2) Results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members 
of the uniformed services under ... title 10 of the United States Code, 
chapter 15 of title 10 of the United States Code, or any other provision of 
law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President 
or Congress. 
Title 10 governs how United States (U.S.) military forces prepare for wartime. 
Executing contingency contracting during peacetime without the declared title 10 status 
means that the acquisition officer does not have access to streamlined or urgent 
procedures available in modern federal acquisition regulations. The title 10 status 
declaration creates a contracting environment allowing for faster turnover of contracts in 
a condensed timeline compared to peacetime operations. From a supported unit 
perspective, preparing for an anticipated contingency before the official declaration could 
create problems with funding during early stages of an operation. In contrast, from a 
contracting perspective, the garrison/peacetime environment provides less pressure to 
meet deadlines and is typically supported by non-deployable contracting staff. Regardless 
of the environment, today’s fiscal realities require cost-consciousness in business 
practices.  
Recent testimony by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter regarding the defense 
budget underscores the urgency for all departments to better define business practices in 
all areas eradicating inefficiencies, which includes contingency contracting.  
American taxpayers rightly have trouble comprehending—let alone 
supporting—the defense budget when the(y) read of cost overruns, lack of 
accounting and accountability, needless overhead, and the like.  
If we’re asking taxpayers to not only give us half a trillion of their hard-
earned dollars, but also give us more than we got last year, we have to 
demonstrate that we can be responsible with it. We must do all we can to 
spend their money more wisely and more responsibly. We must reduce 







DOD has sought to continuously improve our acquisition processes over 
the past five years, and I am proud myself to have been a part of that 
effort. Today, I am recommitting the Defense Department to working both 
with Congress, and on our own, to find new and more creative ways of 
stretching our defense dollars to give our troops the weapons. (Carter, 
2015, p. 4)  
 
Meeting Ashton Carter’s intent requires diligence in identifying value for each 
dollar spent. The key to re-evaluating business practices in contingency contracting 
resides in Phase 0, known operationally as the shaping phase, as actions here have a 
significant impact in later stages of operations according to JP 4–10 Operational 
Contract Support. Acquisition and non-acquisition performance standards defined for 
spending and contingency contracting outcomes are important to creating a cost-efficient 
environment. These standards defined in the presiding acquisition regulation, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) are listed in Figure 1 with some supporting text meant to 
translate the performance standards into a contingency contracting environment, with a 
non-acquisition focus.  
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 Federal Acquisition Performance Standards and Contingency Contracting  Figure 1. 
 
After the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (2015,1.102). The supporting analysis of 
FAR performance standards focuses on contingency contracting.  
Actions taken during the planning phase enable logisticians and commanders to 
move from reactive and ad-hoc logistical support to deliberate contract planning that is 
capable of supporting the aforementioned performance standards. The 2014 release of 
Joint Publication Operational Contract Support added phase 0, referred to as the shaping 
operations, to the operational model (CJCS, 2014a). Previous OCS doctrine, prepared 
during large stability operations, focused on changing authorities with the rotation of 
units into and out of an established theater of operations, rather than providing general 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation describes contracting performance applicable to any phase of an 
operation in section 1.102. 
 
1. “Satisfy[ing] the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or 
service.”  
 This includes incorporating stakeholder needs, such as achieving competition to lower costs 
representing the taxpayer’s interests. For contingency contracting professionals, this can mean fully 
utilizing current contracting initiatives, such as developing and leveraging the market base to develop 
healthy competition. Within a contingency environment, operational planners can incorporate cost-
consciousness into the outsourcing plans by ensuring that the contracting officers are resourced with 
the time necessary to develop this market base. 
 
2. “Minimizing administrative operating costs.” 
  Achieving the best value of contingency contracting requires considering the initial award 
cost along with the total cost of manpower to provide contractor management, administer, and 
ultimately closing a contract. Developing contract management plans with the total cost of the 
contract, to include claims and oversight, can better inform leader’s looking to minimize 
administrative costs in contingency contracting environments.  
 
3. “Conduct[ing] business with integrity, fairness, and openness.” 
 Creating an ethical climate in a contingency contracting arena is not only a contracting 
office(r) requirement, but extends to the supported unit, referred to as the requiring activity, and the 
commander. Conducting each contract award and administration with the highest level of ethics 
requires a well-trained and professional workforce ultimately creates the perception of an equitable 
business environment confidently supporting good civil-military relations.  
 
4. “Fulfill[ing] public policy objectives” 
  Fulfilling policy objectives in a contingency environment can be a lesser task when compared 
to a garrison environment when contracting under streamlined acquisition protocols. Although, 
ensuring that an operational commander’s strategic objectives, like procuring commodities from host 
nation sources, are included in the acquisition strategy may take a higher precedence in a 
contingency, versus garrison environment. 
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initial entry operations guidance or readiness metrics. As contingencies evolve from 
mainly stability and reconstruction operations to global and rapid-response missions, 
logistical needs procured on local economies incorporates initial entry environments in 
either mature or immature theaters of operation. Establishing unity of effort among the 
commander, the host nation, allied country, and contractors requires each service to 
execute well-crafted and well-integrated OCS/logistics plans taking into account 
conditions including crises action planning in initial entry environments. The 2014 
addition of the shaping phase to OCS doctrine provides the opportunity to define 
activities relevant for all services in the military’s current operational environment. 
Developing processes for the shaping phase starts with a review of current doctrine. 
B. PROBLEM 
Over the last ten years, several major commissions found inefficiency and ad-hoc 
responses in contingency contracting, which contributed to high levels of fraud, waste, 
and abuse. The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations (Gansler Commission) conducted separate investigations into contingency 
contracting efforts in starting in 2007–2009. Overall, they found that the Army, the lead 
service for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan had been unprepared for the number of 
contractors on the battlefield. These operations found the ratio of contractors to service 
members approaching 1:1. The CWC specifically estimated over 5 billion of dollars was 
lost due to poor oversight (CWC, 2009, p. 86.) The commissions called for better 
contractor management, accountability and oversight in expeditionary contracting. 
Institutionalizing these lessons learned and appropriately planning for contracting into 
future operations prevents the risk of fraud, waste and abuse. 
The DOD has identified Operational Contract Support as a new core defense 
capability and identified key capability gaps requiring closure for the vision supporting 
the Future Force 2020 (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program 
Support [DASDPS], 2014a). However, there are four key challenges that the services 
face while working towards this goal. First, no other services have created the same depth 
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of OCS and contingency contracting doctrine, education, and personnel structures as  
the Army. Second, this doctrine was developed largely during stability operations and 
requires re-tooling in this era of post-Afghanistan and Iraq operations. Third, the  
recent addition of phase 0 requires re-definition. Finally, OCS and contingency 
contracting is not fully recognized across all DOD departments as a critical aspect to 
readiness (Defense Science Board, 2014; Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
2015). Further expanding the OCS framework is necessary not only to develop lessons 
learned but also to adapt current doctrine while meeting today’s new threats and 
budgetary climate. 
C. PURPOSE 
This project evaluates Joint and Army force’s Operational Contract Support and 
contingency contracting planning doctrine and best practices for relevancy to other 
services. Each service needs to define the role that the relatively new function, OCS, 
plays in its organization as DOD level initiatives require the institutionalization of this 
function through the force. To date, the Army created a large bulk of contingency 
contracting and OCS doctrine, acting as the Lead Service for contracting efforts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Each service has the opportunity to utilize the developed OCS doctrine 
to evaluate for the efficiency of its service constructs. This project analyzes the relevant 
doctrine and practices institutionalizing the OCS framework Joint and Army operations. 
D. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH  
This research report examines the role that OCS planning and integration should 
play during shaping phase operations (Phase 0) at the service component level. Phase 0 is 
the shaping phase as defined in the Joint Publication (JP) Joint Operations. Within the 
Joint planning construct, the shaping phase identifies peacetime activities as “designed to 
dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the 
contingency plan to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set 
conditions for the contingency plan,” and was only recently added to the OCS Joint 
planning construct model (CJCS, 2011a, p. V-8). As a result, OCS spans every phase of 
an operation and plays an important role in the full range of military operations. The 
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addition of a shaping phase to OCS doctrine provides an opportunity to identify and 
evaluate effective readiness activities and doctrinal planning factors applicable to all 
services. Developing a shared understanding in planning, educating, and executing OCS 
shaping activities is critical for planners, operational commanders, and the non-
acquisition community. These activities should support efficiently and effectively 
spending in contingency environments. Operationally defining what the intended effects 
contracting and spending should have on the battlefield can better establish effective 
contingency contracting, and reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this project incorporates a case study approach to examine 
the problem. Two primary models in this thesis were developed acquisition specific 
research models from the Naval Postgraduate School and supports analysis of doctrine 
and planning assets. The activities include interviews with various contracting and 
logistics professionals.  
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• Primary question: What components of current OCS planning doctrine can 
be adapted into single/lead service planning doctrine? 
• Subsidiary question 1: What is the relevant history leading to current OCS 
doctrine and practice? 
• Subsidiary question 2: What are key elements of Joint and Army doctrine 
relevant to single service contingency contracting constructs? 
• Subsidiary question 3: What is the current state of practice in OCS and 
how is it related to single services? 




Several assumptions are critical if other services or the Joint staff use this project 
to assist in crafting OCS solutions. First, this project assumes that OCS is a subset of 
logistics. Logistics planners do facilitate the crafting of an OCS plan supporting a greater 
logistics effort. Just as important, OCS must be integrated into the primary role/function 
of all staff shops during the planning process. Thinking of OCS as only a logistical 
function creates a conflict in the staffing processes. This project assumes that OCS 
requires staff integration during planning and training exercises, with the logistics planner 
primarily responsible for crafting the OCS or contingency contracting plan.    
Finally, as is repeated throughout strategic guidance, OCS is a “commander’s 
responsibility” as it influences the civil-military aspects of the battlefield and the 
operational outcome. The complexity of integrating OCS into an operation rests in the 
potential for contracting activities to impact civil-military aspects of the operational 
environment. For instance, an ethical environment in the contracting process can create 
good will with the host nation contractors while rebuilding an economy during a disaster 
recovery operation. Additionally, contracting is affected by battlefield conditions. For 
instance, if the lines of communication between forces are underdeveloped, movement 
along the host notions road network becomes a challenge. Taking civil-military relations 
into account occurs through appropriate operational framing during MDMP, and the 
evaluation of doctrine here assumes this is already part of the organization’s processes.  
H. LIMITATIONS 
This review does not specifically evaluate the doctrine, education and training 
created by all services including the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marines; rather, 
it focuses on Joint and Army doctrine. The final findings will make recommendations for 
operational level planning factors and supported activities appropriate for shaping phase 
operations. 
One limitation of this research is that the doctrine and best practices evaluated are 
based on the Army’s role in OCS. The Army has taken the primary lead in contracting 
within the last major operations. Each service’s definition and relationship to OCS is 
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unique and requires different personnel solutions for the acquisition and non-acquisition 
doctrine. Services can expect to either support larger Joint forces contracting efforts or 
conduct their own contracting role at the inception of a single service contingency 
(Defense Science Board, 2014). Ultimately, each service will individually define the 
scope, and the applicable OCS role that supports its own operations. These factors will be 
considered in the analysis of doctrine 
I. CONCLUSION 
As stated by Ashton Carter, improving business practices and finding cost savings 
is important in today’s fiscal environment. As the DOD moves to institutionalize OCS 
into the forces, there is a call for OCS best practices and lessons learned. The primary 
benefit of this research is to provide strategic and operational leaders of all services an in-
depth analysis of one service’s doctrinal approach to institutionalizing this function. 
Additionally, this project provides a description of best practices for the OCS process in 
the shaping phase. This project will also provide a historical description of contingency 
contracting and OCS doctrine and legislation, as well as the development of today’s 
acquisition personnel structures. Another benefit of this research is that it provides a 
broader discussion of OCS implementation and practice within all services. Based on my 
research, my recommendations should provide the services tools needed to 
institutionalize OCS. 
Doctrine developed for planning OCS shaping phase activities should be relevant 
for the operational level. The operational level of war is defined in Joint Publication 1.02 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms, page 87 as: “The 
level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and 
sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.” This 
level of war focuses on initial planning and guidance for major theater operations. The 
Army definition of unified land operations includes:  
How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and 
maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations 
through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in  
 
 10 
order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions 
for favorable conflict resolution. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2011b) 
Conducting unified land operations can mean working with smaller units and 
missions outside of a Joint Task Force at the Army Forces or Corps level. Therefore, the 
use of the term operational level includes both concepts, meaning applicable to a joint 
task force or for smaller single service lead contingencies. I examine current doctrine for 
appropriateness to single service lead initial entry, and Joint operations at an operational 
level. To accomplish this, first, I will describe the relevant history leading to OCS 
doctrine and practice. Second, I will identify key elements of relevant doctrine (Joint and 
Army) to single service contingency contracting planning constructs. Then, I will 
describe the current state of practice in OCS and how it is related to single services. 
Finally, I will make specific recommendations for the adaptation of OCS planning factors 
found in Joint and Army doctrine to fit an operational level, single service–led mission.    
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND CONTINGENCY 
CONTRACTING AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
This literature review incorporates a historical perspective to highlight the growth 
and trends of developing structures supporting contingency contracting and Operational 
Contract Support (OCS) from inception to today. This chapter will cover wartime 
contracting through the development of OCS up to current doctrine. An analysis of 
current doctrine will be covered in Chapter III. The Appendix provides a graphic 
depicting the development of historical doctrine, legislation, and developments of OCS. 
This function was recently identified as a defense department’s core capability, and has a 
limited scope of contracting during wartime operations. Therefore, current literature that 
provides a focused historical context and background specific to wartime and 
contingency contracting and doctrine development is limited.   
This literature review uses a strategy similar to a 2010 Naval Postgraduate School 
student thesis titled Contingency Contracting Officer Proficiency Assessment Test 
Development by Juan Arzu, Brian Mack and Biere Castro (2010). Several Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) student theses 
provided a historical perspective and analysis of this field. Additionally, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports 
provided the foundation of legislative history (Arzu et al., 2010). The 2014 OCS Action 
Plan provided the direction and guidance needed for current legislative requirements and 
future development requirements. Finally, the basis of this review was developed from 
the author’s literature review generated in 2015 for a Naval Postgraduate School class 
GB4044 Defense-Focused Managerial Inquiry supporting the Masters of Business 
Administration project development. Since the Army is the main provider of support for 
land forces, it continues to lead doctrine development based on best practices and lessons 
learned in OCS. Therefore, this literature review focuses on both Joint Force and Army 
doctrine. The intent of the literature review is to provide a foundational understanding of 
the relevance of OCS/wartime contracting and track the development of this discipline’s 
doctrine and legislation. 
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For simplicity, this historical perspective literature review identifies overall  
trends in the development of wartime contracting to OCS integration. These trends  
are categorized into major time frames ranging from wartime contracting to 
“institutionalization of OCS,” as depicted in the Appendix. First, I review the extent of 
wartime contracting in major conflicts and discuss resulting legislation. Second, I will 
describe the emergence of the term contingency contracting and development of a  
Joint specialty. Third, the emergence of the term OCS and its evolution provides the 
context for current doctrine. Finally, I describe the movement to fully integrate OCS 
throughout the Defense of Department (DOD). The intent is to provide the services a 
perspective on what policies and procedures they developed resultant of large 
sustainment operations. However, the primarily procedural-based doctrine typically 
neglects the tangible and intangible capabilities that using OCS in missions brings to the 
operational and combatant commander. While literature and studies record the effects of 
poor OCS integration, a limited amount of literature focuses on the positive value of 
deliberate planning. 
A. KEY TERMS 
The term “Operational Contract Support” is still being socialized into Joint forces, 
and the associated supporting terminology has subtleties in historical doctrine. While the 
military has a long history of contracting for supplies and services from commercial 
sources on the battlefield, a formalized approach to planning and integrating them into a 
battlefield operation is a relatively recent phenomenon. Now, the planning framework 
and construct Operational Contract Support (OCS) encapsulates the widely recognized 
term contingency contracting. This literature review uses the terms, as defined in Figure 
2, throughout the literature review. 
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 Operational Contract Support and Ancillary Terms Figure 2. 
 
The graphic describes the term “operational contract support” and how the more known 
subsidiary terms like contingency contracting are used throughout historical literature. 
This was presented in a 2010 Congressional Research Service report titled Department  
of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations (Church & Schwartz, 
2013, p. 3). 
Contingency contracting, from a tactical and operational perspective, is the most 
identifiable term and indicates an overseas contingency declared by the Secretary of 
Defense under title 10 of the United States Code requiring military forces, as covered in 
Chapter I. For the contracting professional, this title 10 authority allows streamlined and 
abbreviated procurements timelines, which enable faster delivery in obtaining the goods 
and services for the warfighter, as compared to peacetime operations. From a planning 
perspective, contracting with commercial sources in this environment is complex 
compared to peacetime. Expeditionary and wartime contracting are terms found in the 
many inspection reports regarding the execution of contingency contracting supporting 
deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The terms wartime and expeditionary 
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contracting indicate an operational environment that may include counterinsurgencies  
or enemy actions although expeditionary contracting also includes domestic disaster 
relief environments. Understanding the differences between these terms assists with 
understanding the associated operational environment surrounding the historical 
literature. 
The modern-day military procurement system’s utilizing commercial sources to 
fulfill wartime needs is not a new trend. Throughout U.S. history, the military has relied 
on contractors in major conflicts to assist in meeting the warfighter’s needs. A common 
pattern is found at the beginning of each conflict developing unique economic conditions. 
On identification of mobilizing forces, logisticians/military planners/operational units 
identify a capability gap and the military’s solicits vendors to help fulfill service and 
supply needs. Vendors/contractors are eager commercial sources who participate and 
capitalize on the chance for profits (Nagle, 1999). The importance of contractor’s 
integration into war plans as steady, despite over 200 years of change, is illustrated in 
Figure 3.  
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 Historical Perspective of integrating contractors in conflicts Figure 3. 
 
The Army’s Commission, called the Gansler Commission, and presented this to congress 
in the 2008 released report. This graphic reflects the trend to incorporate contractors into 
each major conflict through the ratio of contractor’s to service members. (Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2009, p. 21). 
B. WARTIME CONTRACTING 1775–1990 
The period from 1775 to almost 1990 denote a time where significant use of 
contracts meet warfighter needs occurred throughout major and minor conflicts. See the 
Appendix for a doctrine map of legislation, DOD initiatives and doctrine throughout the 
history of OCS to today. During this timeframe, the centralized nature of the 
department’s logistics chains meant little developed of meaningful structures focused on 
executing contingency contracting. This means that contracting with commercial sources 
for wartime was largely ad-hoc and reactive. This era here referred to as “wartime 
contracting,” exhibited a pattern of requiring commodities, and incorporating contractors 
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during major combat operations. Important lessons learned and legislation arose during 
this timeframe. 
1. 18th Century  
While the terms operational contract support and contingency contracting are 
relatively new, procuring on the commercial economy in support of war occurred early in 
American history. In fact, the modern formalized procurement system traces back to a 
need for integrating contractors during the revolutionary war. In 1775, Joseph Trumbull 
was granted the authority to procure on behalf of Congress for the Continental Army, 
(Nagle, 1999). Here, throughout the war, contracting/supply officers were co-located with 
the battlefield unit providing direct contracting support, when supply trains were 
incapable of reaching positions. This early system appeared reactive and prone to supply 
shortages and muddled the responsibilities between the quartermaster and acquisition 
departments (Nagle, 1999). Eventually, Joseph Trumball would be charged and 
eventually cleared of war-profiteering (Nagle, 1999). Congress grants the authority to 
procure for the armed forces and even today, investigations into fraud, waste and abuse 
are answerable to them. 
Legislation passed during this timeframe provides the beginnings of a foundation 
of contingency contracting authority used in subsequent combat operations. For example, 
while Congress works towards authorizing funds for overseas contingency operations, 
military movement without appropriations is available. The Feed and Forage Act  
(41 United States Code (USC) 11) provides the DOD authority to obligate funds beyond 
appropriations for: “clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, and transportation, 
medical, and hospital supplies” (Department of Defense, 2001, September 21). 
Nevertheless, the modern-day emphasis on institutionalizing and implementing 
Operational Contract Support planning and readiness into the forces reduces the risk of 
non-funded emergency contingencies requiring this act 
2. 19th Century 
World Wars I and II supply lines primarily focused on centralized shipping from 
the United States, and support from the British economy for the gaps (Roser, 1984). For 
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the supplies and services needed, from British sources, reliance on Cost, Plus Percentage 
of Cost contracts were common practice during this war (Koster, 1991; Roser, 1984). 
This contract type was thought to incentive industry to adjust factories output to match 
the goods needed by armed forces. These types of contracts are now illegal due to the 
incentive to incur, versus control, costs.  
Understanding that industry’s goals are ultimately to earn profit and benefit their 
enterprise, and not simply to be an extension of the government, might create disharmony 
in establishing unity of effort. The commercial sources here, in a government contractual 
relationship are incrementally rewarded for incurring of costs, are incented to provide  
too many supplies and/or services and the highest prices. This type of contract might 
require active government involvement and oversight, in what is meant to be a more 
decentralized process. Today, price competition and the appropriate cost reduction 
incentives assists in creating a unity of effort in achieving cost controls, and supplying 
the forces. Ultimately, understanding that the industry/market base needs be identified 
and developed during planning phases is important to contingency environments. 
World War II also used small contract agreements within the theater of operations 
to control shipping costs and leverage allies supply lines (Rodeschin, 1997). The use of 
government credit cards and imprest type fund instruments on local economies offer 
efficient and speedy avenues to procuring in foreign economies. Today, this typically is 
leveraged through declaring title 10 authorities, thereby waiving the garrison/peacetime 
procedures and accessing streamlined procedures. Many conflicts since utilize the 
strategy of smaller purchases to meet warfighter needs quickly and efficiently. The 
Korean conflict uses an entirely different strategy to provide troops equipment and 
services. 
Contractor’s supplies and services on the battlefield directly impacted the unity of 
effort and logistical capabilities of combatant commanders in the Korean and Vietnam 
wars. U.S. Forces during the Korean conflict relied on a large contracting effort in 
overseas operations providing all classes of supplies moving away from shipping supplies 
from the United States to augment overseas mission (Allen et all, 2010). Two major 
problems surrounded supplying forces through contingency contracting in the Korean 
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Conflict. First, contracting officers worked without an official declaration of war leaving 
them reliant on peacetime logistical supply lines and procedures (Mason, 1984; Torreon, 
2015). Today, the significance of establishing title 10 authorities, both overseas and 
domestically, is pivotal in providing rapid response supplies and services from 
commercial sources. Second, the Korean conflict found many services procured through 
the host nation and through Japan but the process was fraught with cultural disconnects 
(Bok, 1987). The South Korean market base was adequate in size to provide the quantity 
and quality of goods necessary for U.S. forces (Bok, 1987). Additionally, the military 
specification and standards needed for items, such as vegetables, required the forces to 
train/educate the local businessmen to develop a more viable business base in South 
Korea (Bok, 1987; Koster, 1991; Mason, 1984). Today, understanding that culturally 
informed interaction between host-nation contractors and members of the U.S. armed 
impacts civil-military relations (CJCS, 2014b). The lesson here is, understanding that 
contracting in local economics requires the development of a viable vendor base for the 
most needed commodities and an understanding of the cultural influences of the local 
economy. Developing the contingency contracting business environment during planning 
phases will be discussed in later chapters. 
The Vietnam conflict also lacked a formal declaration of war (Mason, 1984). 
While some attribute this to difficulties in contingency contracting in the theater, specific 
contingency authorities established to waive the socio-economic programs and 
preferences used in “garrison” or peace-time contracting today were not in place. 
Contracting officers may have benefited from the relationships and market base built in 
Korea (Rodeschin, 1997). An area of weakness, the Comptroller General of the United 
States reported issues in the construction contract management arena finding the 
contracting community unprepared for the extent of construction (Comptroller General of 
the United States, 1970). A theme in the audit is the recommendation to streamline 
construction contracting into one lead service agency to reduce costs and the occurrence 
of duplicative requirements for one material need. In 1980, the newly created Office of 
Federal Procurement and Policy established a uniform procurement regulation, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 1980 as a coordinated and uniform system to 
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guide federal procurements. Although, it would be years before these regulations 
recognized contingency contracting title 10 waivers to time-consuming socio-economic 
programs in favor of timely delivery schedules. For contingency contracting situations, 
the Air Force and the Army created guides and doctrine to support the efforts. A 
researcher at the Air Force Institute of Technology found them not substantive to assist 
contracting officers finding unofficial documents more useful (Mason, 1984).  
a. 1982 Definition of Contingency Contracting 
An early service specific, definition for contingency contracting existed in the Air 
Force regulation 70–7 governing contingency contracting. This definition was extracted 
from a master’s degree student thesis at AFIT titled Contingency contracting during low-
intensity conflicts by Mason written in 1988. 
Contingency contracting support plans for deployments provide for 
contracting actions to be completed according to all laws, executive 
orders, and regulations that apply. As a rule, deployed contracting officers 
are able to use small purchase procedures to buy required supplies and 
services. (Mason, 1984, p. 12) 
The above definition found in the Air Force regulation was referenced to be a 
total of three pages, and reflects still a centralized structure for providing for supplies and 
services through “small purchases.” Soon this condition changes as the need for supplies 
and services expands with the trend in outsourcing rising over the next few decades. One 
of the earliest definitions of contingency contracting is found in a student thesis as a 
proposed definition from the Director of Logistics for the Joint Chief of Staff. The 
memorandum recommends the inclusion into Joint publications both a definition of 
contingency and contingency contracting responding to perceived gaps in “on the spot” 
contracting in deployed environments. 
 
b. 1988 Proposed Definition of Contingency Contracting 
The following contingency contracting definition was suggested to be added to 
the Joint regulations and publications in 1988. This definition was extracted from a 
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master’s degree student thesis at AFIT titled Contingency Contracting during Low-
Intensity Conflicts by Mason, R.L. 
Contingency Contracting: Contracting performed in support of 
peacetime contingency in an overseas location pursuant to the policies and 
procedures of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory System. (Mason, 1984, 
p. 42) 
The reference to the application of peacetime operations might be a reflection 
there was little distinction between peacetime and wartime contracting procedures. 
Currently, declaring title 10 contingency operations allows contracting officers to access 
streamlined procedures to assist in responding in abbreviated and constrained timelines, 
compared to peacetime operations. The memorandum further recommends the start of 
providing waivers to peacetime acquisition procedure, specifically raising small 
acquisition thresholds. This begins the genesis of contingency contracting awareness with 
the combatant commands and Joint policies.  
A decade after the Vietnam War, several key pieces of legislation created the 
acquisition branch and formed the acquisition structures known today. The Packard 
Commission examined the defense acquisition structure calling for education and 
experience of military and civilian acquisition personnel. Soon after, legislation created 
the head of the acquisition professionals, providing a focal point for the fragmented 
acquisition workforce. Many years later, in 1989, under the Bush administration, the 
Army Acquisition Corps came into being with a projected strength of 1,350 military and 
civilian personnel (Lumb, 1999, p. 34) The organizations efforts remained focused 
primarily on major weapons system focused acquisitions, not necessarily creating a 
distinctive niche for wartime contracting. Today, the roles between the two are vastly 
different although they both use the terms operational contract support. One role supports 
contingencies, the other supports major weapon’s system fielding. Although, the lessons 
learned of this time era emphasizes the need for an acquisition focused senior leader to 
advocate for the function during the planning process. 
The end of the cold war presented new global threats and operational battlefield 
conditions quite different than those of the European logistical infrastructure. Most likely, 
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the end of the cold war created shelves of now unneeded contingency plans, and faced 
with planning for the next conflict, found leaders facing an uncertain and unknown new 
enemy. Logistical elements now needed a new approach to providing support—although 
the workforce significantly downsized, to include logistical elements leaving the forces 
even more dependent on contractors to assist in executing combat missions (Allen et al., 
2010).  
C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING AND THE 20TH CENTURY 
A contingency contracting framework developed through lessons learned in 
Desert Shield. The development of doctrine, law and regulations become more rapid. The 
Appendix provides a timeline and icon representation of the associated works from this 
period. The rapid deployment and buildup of forces in a new theater required extensive 
commercial support providing a challenging first 45 days for contracting officers (Koster, 
1991). The contracting activities handled up to 80 new requirements a day although 
staffed by contracting officers with little to no experience in contingency environments 
(Koster, 1991) Expanding the streamlined contingency contracting procedures assisted in 
meeting these requirements by raising the threshold for small purchases from the 
peacetime $25,000 limit to $100,000 in the 1991 Appropriations Act, Public Law. 101–
510, November 5 1990 (Rodeschin, 1997). The end of operations in Desert Storm and 
Desert Shield led to a substantial downsizing leaving the forces ever more reliant on 
contractors to support logistics. As a result, the subsequent versions of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations included consideration and provisions for better access to 
streamlined procedures. 
The lessons learned in providing for Desert Shield drove lawmakers and the DOD 
to respond with new resources. First, contingency contracting focused acquisition 
doctrine was incepted. Second, a new position called the Contingency Contracting 
Officer (CCO) was created establishing a contingency contracting acquisition 
subspecialty. The contracting function acted as a decentralized special staff function. This 
researcher found the earliest evidence of the Army’s assignment of a formal position of 
“Contingency Contracting Officer” designated to Army forces in a 1993 Naval 
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Postgraduate student thesis titled “Contingency contracting officers: Can they adequately 
support the force?” (Campbell, 1993). In this study, contracting officers indicated 
difficulties due to the late integration of CCO in the deployment and an institutional 
unawareness of their position (Campbell, 1993). In 1993, the Air Force Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) numbers one and two were the primary 
contingency contracting doctrine focused primarily for the acquisition professional. A 
student thesis at Naval Postgraduate School provides a narrative and analysis of this 
doctrine, which was unavailable at the time of writing this project. They speculated that 
the upcoming revision of the 1998 AFFARS would create the beginnings of a contracting 
structure beyond the recognition of a single CCO deployed (Rodeschin, 1997).  
With an established awareness and development of the contingency contracting 
specialty, the focus shifted to integrating this new specialty into the force. The general 
theme of subsequent doctrine was creating an awareness that the responsibility for 
contractors was confined to the contracting process itself, rather, that there are supporting 
relationships that commanders and battlefield commanders are responsible to fulfill. The 
documents lacked contingency contracting planning procedures to create a cohesive 
effort in executing contingency contracting in Joint operations. The concept of 
contractors as part of the total force is evident in doctrine and legislation during the late 
1990s. The first example of the doctrine was through 1996 Department of Defense 
Instruction (DODI) 3020.37 titled Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services 
During Crises. This is not contracting specific guidance but provides the emphasis that 
contractors are a part of the “total force” and require consideration in contingency plans, 
especially when overseas. Contracting is only explicitly mentioned once.  
The Department of the Army regulations addressing policies, responsibilities,  
and procedures for using contractors on the battlefield and provides an early contingency 
contracting definition in the 1993 Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement  
No. 2. 
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1. 1996 Acquisition Specific Contingency Contracting Definition 
Contingency Contracting: The provision of those essential supplies and 
services needed to execute and sustain the mission. It includes emergency 
contracting in the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the 
continental United States (OCONUS) for those actions necessary for the 
mobilization and deployment of units.  
The earliest contingency contracting definition this researcher found was in an 
Army supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. The acquisition 
specific regulation describes how contracting officer’s fit into a contingency operation 
through describing the capabilities and effects that contingency contracting brings to the 
battlefield. This regulation provides the acquisition officer relief from some federal 
acquisition timelines by raising the simplified acquisition threshold for declared 
contingencies. This allows contracting officers to more quickly fulfill smaller purchases 
without the burden of non-contingency or peacetime requirement advertising timelines, 
or advertising timelines. As discussed in Chapter I, declaring a contingency under title 10 
allows for streamlined protocols when contracting for wartime missions. While 
acquisition specific guidance for contingency contracting was available, limited Army 
specific non-acquisition documentation was created during this time. 
2. 1999 Non-acquisition Contingency Contracting Definition 
This researcher found an early non-acquisition definition in the 1999 Army Field 
Manual 100–10–2 Contracting Support on the Battlefield. 
Contingency contracting is the process by which essential supplies and 
services needed to sustain deployed forces are obtained on behalf of the 
U.S. Government. It includes emergency contracting in the continental 
United States (CONUS) or outside the continental United States 
(OCONUS) for those actions necessary to support mobilizing and 
deploying units. This manual addresses contingency contracting, 
commonly associated with Army contracting personnel procuring goods 
and services in support of deployed Army forces to supplement organic 
combat service support (CSS) capabilities. (Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, 1999a, p. 1–2) 
The supporting definition is procedural and defines contingency contracting as a 
process distinct from a weapon’s system focus, in terms of planning. The focus remains 
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on meeting the warfighters needs and subordinated the function, hinting at integration 
across the logistics realm (supply primarily, transportation or ordnance corps.) No 
acknowledgement remains of inclusion into an operations order or planning process. The 
risk here is that contingency contracting would remain an ad-hoc logistics function. 
The regulation identified the need and importance of contingency contracting and 
addresses the community to accept contractors into the total force mix. This definition 
leaves the non-acquisition user to define whether direct contracting support was 
applicable to their organization, presumably if the resulting contract required services or 
personnel. This definition is reinforced by the Field Manual (FM) 100–10–2 Contracting 
Support on the Battlefield, published at the same time. This field manual is designed for 
non-contracting/acquisition personnel both identifying and defining contingency 
contracting as a subset of logistics. Notably, this field manual identifies that executing 
contingency contracting during wartime has strategic implications on the battlefield, 
although it does not specifically define them. The ‘pre-deployment activities’ of 
contracting officers are described with the end-state as maintaining a rapid-deployment 
capability, albeit was ad-hoc as planning for this function began at notification of mission 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999a).  
Overall, the doctrine of the time identified the need and importance of planning 
and integrating contingency contracting, but provided little evidence of organization wide 
procedures to accomplish this. A researcher at this time found an emphasis on the 
importance of contingency contracting at a joint operations level, but identified a gap in 
the doctrine in defining procedurally how this should be done (Leisenring, 1997). This 
timeframe found crises action planning in overseas environments which required 
integrated procedures and doctrine into operations like those executed in Somalia and 
Bosnia. Additionally, the researcher found Joint and Army doctrine available at this time 
insufficient to maintain efficient contracting in contingency environments (Leisenring, 
1997). Soon, major changes in contingency contracting doctrine and procedures would 
result from events after the launch of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. 
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D. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING AND REFORM IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
Understanding the history of Army contracting structures is important to evaluate 
today’s relevant OCS doctrine. Two key commissions identifying the challenges and cost 
of inefficient contingency contracting operations resulted in the emergence of the first 
programmatic approach to this function. Their findings sparked major changes in, and the 
emergence of, contingency contracting related Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) 
solutions. The theme of this time recognized that doctrine and training were needed to 
support the amount of spending and contracting functions on the battlefield in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The contractor’s on the battlefield equaled approximately the same number 
of uniformed service-members. The commissions brought awareness to the need for 
appropriate planning and oversight of contingency contracting. The doctrine at the time 
fulfilled the capability gap surrounding tactical level non-acquisition contract oversight 
and procedures during stability operations, referred to as post-Gansler influence 
throughout this MBA project. To aid in the understanding of the emergence of this 
doctrine, first I will discuss the contracting structures in place at the beginning of major 
operations. 
The force structure that took the Army into major theater combat operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the new organizations built during that time, heavily 
influenced the doctrine available today. The Army developed the Army Contracting 
Agency (ACA) in 2002 to act as both a centralized acquisition focused Command and 
contracting authority (Hannon, 2004). The ACA structure came to being during a time of 
downsizing and a need for consolidation of disparate contracting activities throughout the 
force. This affected the Army Garrison Commander as the control over the budget 
personnel and structure of contracting offices moved to the ACA. Additionally, the 
contracting authority moved from an assigned Principal Assistant Responsible for 
Contracting (PARC) to the ACA regional headquarters (Hannon, 2004). Research 
indicates that the organization suffered resource shortages during this period, which could 
affect the upcoming major operations in Iraq beginning in 2003.  
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On the eve of major operations, the Army released new acquisition focused 
contracting doctrine. The theme of this doctrine primarily acknowledged that contractors 
are part of the total force mix when in deployed situations. In 2003, the Army updated the 
manual reflecting some lessons learned in FM 3–100.21 Contractors on the Battlefield. 
The key change from previous doctrine is the identification of integrating contractor 
management as essential for support synchronization and protection/accountability of 
contractor personnel. The regulation recognizes that integration of a contracting support 
plan is not required by the primary operational planning doctrine (Field Manual 5–0) but 
relies on common practices (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003). A significant 
portion of the document describes the specific logistical aspects of considering 
contractors as part of the total force. This document with this theme remain in place until 
major combat operations begin in Iraq and Afghanistan, just prior to major contingency 
contracting reform. 
The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act section 854 further directed the 
Secretary of Defense to develop a Joint policy and contingent contracting formalized 
program. This includes a “preplanned organizational approach” to contingency 
operations. Military services are directed to appoint primary personnel (a senior 
commissioned officer or Senior Executive Service member) to oversee Joint contingency 
contracting policy. The efforts of all services after this requirement represents a profound 
effect on the arena of contingency contracting, spawning a new era. The commencement 
of major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan finds contracting officers requiring 
centralized support and the contractor management function too wieldy to oversee with 
newly, or un-trained non-acquisition personnel. 
1. Acquisition Reform and Contingency Contracting 
Over the last decade, contingency contracting played a large role in overseas 
missions for operational units. Contractors provided key services, supplying necessary 
commodities, and enabling the application of civil support programs. Spending in these 
areas was significant with contract obligations in overseas environments from 1999 to 
2012 ranged between $170 to $360 billion dollars (Schwartz & Ginsberg, 2013). The 
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ratio of contractors to service members consistently equaled one another, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and with that, issues surrounding contractor oversight and fraud, waste and 
abuse. After six years of combat, the DOD and Congress responded with two key 
initiatives: 1) The Gansler Commission focused on a systemic review on contracting 
procedures and 2) The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(CWC) assessed specific actions within the theater. Both these initiatives provided 
recommendations for development and improvement of structures, policies, and 
resources for managing the contingency contracting process. 
a. The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management 
(Gansler Commission) 
Understanding how the Army adapted to the Commission on Army Acquisition 
and Program Management (Gansler Commission) finding is important to allow other 
services to glean their own policies, structures, and way forward. The Commission, 
launched by the Secretary of the Army in 2007, took place during a time of an emerging 
pattern of headlines declaring fraud, waste and abuse associated with contingency 
contracting. This independent commission was headed by Jacques Gansler, reviewed five 
years of expeditionary operations (through the testimony of over 100 individuals directly 
involved) and made recommendations. The following findings and recommendations led 
to major improvements in resources for the contingency contracting community, both 
acquisition and non-acquisition focused.    
(1) Findings: 
Insufficient Resources to Monitor Contractor Performance 
Cultural understanding of contracting throughout warfighter force 
Impact of contractors performing on the battlefield 
Inadequate contracting regulations for expeditionary operations 
Lack of recognition of complexity of contracting 
Insufficient focus and resources on post-award contract management 
Extremely poor interagency operations 
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Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary 
operations 
(2) Recommendations:  
Increase training and career field of contracting personnel in expeditionary 
operations 
Restructure to facilitate contractor management in expeditionary operation 
Increase training for expeditionary contracting activities 
Develop legislative, regulatory and policy assistance to enable contracting 
effectiveness (CWC, 2007) 
This report resulted in recognizing contingency contracting as a focused 
discipline. The identified capability gap required leadership, personnel, training and 
doctrine focused on contracting in contracting in expeditionary environments.  
b. The Commission on Wartime Contracting 
A major emphasis on contractor oversight to mitigate the risk of fraud, waste  
and abuse, is the emphasis of this document. This congressionally sponsored commission 
and independent council investigated the contracting operations in expeditionary 
environments including Iraq and Afghanistan. The final report Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks issued in 2011 estimated billions of 
dollars lost to fraud, waste and abuse (Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2009). The key findings included serious problems in the planning 
and oversight of contracting functions. Weaknesses found in the contracting process 
included poorly defined requirements determination processes; disparate service-specific 
contracting organizations and processes, and poor oversight procedures. This report 
spurred reform and overhaul of the doctrine, training, organization, laws and regulations 
relating to the planning and of contingency contracting in expeditionary operations. In 
fact, this report continues to influence and shape the development of this field. 
The results of both the Gansler Commission and Commission on Wartime 
Contracting increased the awareness and stature of contingency contracting. The 
identification of resourcing both acquisition and non-acquisition personnel became a 
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reality. The Army established the Army Contracting Command (ACC) within a  
year of these events. The ACC and its subordinate agency Expeditionary Contracting 
Command lead contracting efforts in major combat operations emphasizing a 
professional workforce.  
c. Key Legislation 
In response to this reform, Joint and U.S. Army forces formalized an 
expeditionary focused contracting command structure and developed policy, doctrine and 
training. Not only did training focus on developing contingency contracting officers 
specializing in this area, but also focused training on the non-acquisition personnel. The 
Army offered a functional designator with required training focused on creating 
personnel capable of supporting tactical commanders in all aspects of contract support in 
contingency environments. Many factors addressed here launched the eventual initiative 
for Joint and Army doctrine to develop more specific guidance and a larger planning 
framework for contingency contracting. The NDAA 2007, 2008 and 2013 are key 
legislation driving the transformation of OCS into a core defense capability. 
(1) 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA):  
The NDAA identifies and directs the development of Joint OCS policies and 
resources. Additionally, this legislation defined contingency program management as: 
Planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the combined 
efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and organizations 
for the management of a specific defense acquisition program or programs 
during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency 
operations. (National defense authorization act for fiscal year 2007)  
Contingency contracting is defined as “all stages of the process of acquiring 
property or services by the Department of Defense during a contingency operation,” 
(110th Congress, 2007). 
These definitions impose a needed framework and oversight similar to major 
acquisition programs onto the process. This provides the oversight and focal point to 
develop an institutional approach. Further that contingency contracting in “all stages” can 
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mean to include peacetime operations. Further, the OCS program management is related 
to meet JFC objectives.  
(2) 2008 NDAA: 
The 2008 NDAA directs the collection of lessons learned in contingency 
contracting and the development of non-acquisition focused training. Additionally, the 
2008 NDAA directed the development of the Initial Capabilities Document, discussed 
below. Relevant for all services, the NDAA directs training non-acquisition personnel 
who may be designated to support contracting duties in a deployed environment. Training 
non-acquisition personnel can effect and require changes to their DOTMLPF-P. The 
Army, developed mobile training teams and a curriculum to supplement non-acquisition 
focused training for operational units deploying requiring support. This advent will be 
covered in later chapters.  
These pieces of key legislation, commissions and reviews provided the political 
will and resources to create the contingency contracting acquisition structures of today. 
More importantly, this reform underscores the need to create a structured approach when 
contracting in contingency environments. OCS was critical to the operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan where the ratio of contractors to service members approached a one to 
operation. Some might argue that the sheer size and effort of both Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is what lent to the conditions for fraud,  
waste, and abuse. Large stability and reconstruction conditions are not likely in the near 
future, as the force faces a new challenge, fiscal austerity. Today’s post-stability and 
reconstruction missions can benefit from a larger focus on cost-consciousness in OCS 
business practices achievable through deliberate planning and shaping phase processes. 
The DOD now has an OCS framework to assist in this process. 
E. THE EMERGENCE OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
The move from contingency contracting, to an overarching framework was 
introduced by the Joint publication (JP) 4–10 “Operational Contract Support” in 2008. 
The Joint doctrine introduces a new term: Operational contract support (OCS) 
encompassing the process of planning and executing contract support in contingencies. 
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The OCS planning framework subordinates contingency contracting to a larger set of 
functions: contract support integration, contractor management, and contracting support. 
These pillars are necessary, in a Joint environment, to create an OCS plan, where 
successful OCS is defined. 
1. 2008 Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract Support 
Successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and 
synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management 
of contractor personnel providing that support to the Joint force in a 
designated operational area. (CJCS, 2008) 
This outcome based definition is multi-dimensional recognizing a separation 
between the execution of contingency contracting, contract support integration and 
contractor management. OCS here might be interpreted as beginning when an operation 
is named, or “when a need from a requiring activity is first identified and concludes with 
contract close out,” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999b). The regulations at 
the time both neglect to underscore the importance of planning OCS during peacetime by 
defining procedures whenever a capability gap is identified within the context of 
planning. This approach was relevant as most contingency contracting was executed 
within the context of large stability operations, and generating new requirements was 
under an established contracting structure. The term “contingency contracting” is most 
recognizable to the operational force. 
2008 Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract Support 
Contingency contracting is the process of obtaining goods, services and 
construction from commercial sources via contracting means in support of 
contingency operations. It is a subset of contract support integration and 
does not include the requirements development, prioritization and  
budgeting processes. Contracts used in a contingency include theater 
support, systems support, and external support contracts. (CJCS., 2008, 
p. 1–2) 
The OCS framework in JP 4–10 articulates to the warfighter how to employ the 
OCS capabilities through the three associated functions: contractor management, contract 
integration and contracting support. This framework provides a process that assists in 
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integrating those with contracting authority, and the term “Operation Concept Support” 
continues to evolve. 
The Army also adopted OCS into its evolving contracting structure during the 
height of executing unprecedented contractor support levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
2007, the contractor presence on the battlefield approximately matched the warfighter 
presence. The Gansler Commission gave the political attention needed to create the 
contracting support and resources required at a time when little structure was apparent. 
The Army met this challenge by creating organizational solutions to manage 
procurements and contractor management. The Army Contracting Command, a two-star 
level command developed in 2008, was designed to perform all levels of contracting 
work and support from major weapon’s systems to contingency contracting. Their 
primary mission effects the warfighter through the full spectrum of operations through 
subordinate commands. The Mission Installation Contracting Command with field 
directorates executed over $7.6 billion dollars in support in FY 2012 alone (United States 
Army Contracting Command, February 6, 2015). The Expeditionary Contracting 
Command expeditionary, a one-star command, supports Joint and Army specific stateside 
and overseas contingency operations. Their stated mission is to provide all functions  
of operational contract support and contingency contracting with rapid response.  
Their supporting structures, the Contract Support Brigades are regionally aligned with 
each combatant command executing $1.75 billion dollars in FY 2014 with over 
1,800 personnel relayed in a personal communication. From 2008 to 2014, the vast 
amount of lessons learned best practices and the doctrine in use today emerged. Non-
acquisition education was also expanded at this time. The Army Logistics University 
began offering a 2-week focused course designed for officers and non-commissioned 
officers involved with planning and integrating OCS at a tactical or operational level. The 
Additional Skill Identifier 3C denoting “Operational Contract Support” was created and 
is described in the following chapter. The next chapters describes the Army’s 
expeditionary contracting supporting organizations, best practices and doctrine for 
applicability to other services. 
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The legislation directed formation and the upkeep of a new Joint OCS framework 
tasked to Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (now the DASD) for Program 
Support. Under the auspices of the DASD, the Operational Contract Support Concept of 
Operations defines a unifying strategy recognizing the value that institutionalizing OCS, 
as a component of program management, brings to the forces (Assistant Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense [Program Support], 2010): 
Build a balanced and versatile Joint force. 
Maintain the capability to project and sustain military power over global 
distances. 
Improve the ability to operate in urban environments. 
Markedly increase language and cultural capabilities and capacities. 
Markedly improve the ability to integrate with other U.S. agencies and other 
partners. 
Improve organizational solutions for protracted missions that cut across 
geographical boundaries. 
Develop innovative and adaptive leaders down to the lowest levels. 
2. 2010 Money As a Weapon System 
Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) changed the definition and scope of 
contingency contracting from providing tactically for the warfighter, to enabling 
economic programs affecting the battlefield. OCS and contingency contracting are often 
stated to directly impact the operational environment on the battlefield, and MAAWS 
provides some insights on that aspect. In 2010, Iraq and Afghanistan operational 
commanders benefited from programs instituted as describes in MAAWS. The theaters of 
Iraq and Afghanistan incorporated economic programs into the counterinsurgency 
strategy. This doctrine was a financial management policy enabling economic tools for 
the operational/ground commander aimed at providing positive effects through economic 
means. 
This document’s themes are relevant to planning for OCS in today’s environment. 
MAAWS created and assigned responsibility for contracting through the often quoted 
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“contracting has to be a commander’s business.” Contingency contracting can affect the 
operational environment deliberately, for instance through embedding socio-economic 
goals providing preferences in the bidding process to host nation countries. In MAAWS, 
leaders are challenged to think “beyond cost, schedule and performance,” to include goals 
of achieving less tangible benefits through developing relationships and addressing 
security issues. While the operations in those theaters benefited from economies of scale, 
host nation economies benefited from outside spending. 
Overall, MAAWS articulated that procuring goods and services can affect the 
local operational economy. Impacting civil-military relations on the battlefield through 
free-enterprise can benefit commanders. A Naval Postgraduate School student thesis,  
“Shoot, Move, Communicate, Purchase: How United States Special Forces Can Better 
Employ Money As A Weapon System,” analyzes some of these initiatives within the 
context of smaller team operations. Debate still occurs as to whether MAAWS 
counterinsurgency initiatives were effective. Either way, the programs and awareness 
developed from this document are still taught and replicated today. 
F. INSTITUTIONALIZING OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
We must take aggressive steps to institutionalize OCS within the 
Department, generating capacity to deliver effects when and where they 
are needed to support the full range of military operations. This initiative 
is critical to achieving our national and operational objectives, ensuring 
compliance with Federal statutes, and supporting commander’s needs. 
(Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support 
[DASDPS], 2013, p. 1)   
OCS faces two key challenges when institutionalizing this function across the 
force. First, the drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the DOD 
challenges to meet different national security objectives requires a new approach. 
Second, the declaration of OCS as a core defense capability changed the stature of this 
area and immediately set forth the resources needed to develop this capability across the 
services. OCS and contingency contracting regulations written primarily during stability 
operations, now need redefining in this post-stability/reconstruction period. Newer 
missions include smaller forces, and require the ability to conduct initial entry operations, 
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as compared with OIF/OEF operations focused on transition units with already 
established operations in a mature theater. Even with the drawdown of forces in deployed 
environments, the commitment of resources in developing OCS is increasing.   
The goal of OCS DOD institutionalization is to optimize this function into the 
DOD fulfilling Joint Force 2020 concept (DASDPS, 2014a). This vision intends to fully 
institutionalize and develop the OCS capability throughout the DOD by 2018. Following 
is a brief overview of primary strategic documents guiding OCS into the future force.  
1. OCS Institutional Change Focal Points 
The OCS Joint Concept (OSC JC) validated the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC), identifies continuance of integrating contractors on the battlefield in 
future mission. The concept intends to integrate and institutionalize OCS into the Joint 
forces by 2020 (CJCS, 2013). The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) also approved by 
the JROC, identifies the capability gaps critical necessary to fulfill the vision that OCS is 
a DOD core competency. The critical OCS capabilities gaps (Figure 4) provide guidance 
for the services to better develop and institutionalize this area.  
 DOD Identified Operational Contract Support Capability Gaps Figure 4. 
 
This capability gap analysis provides the overarching direction of DOD institutional 
capability gaps requiring solutions to fulfill the Joint Force 2020 vision (DASDPS, 2013).  
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The OCS Action Plan, a living document, and forum, consisting of over 
170 different actions each service and office must fulfill to close the capability gap and 
achieve the Joint forces vision. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program 
Support (DASDPS) and Vice Director, Directorate of Logistics, Joint Staff maintain and 
preside over this OCS Action Plan. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established the OCS Functional Capabilities 
Integration Board (FCIB) in March 2010 ((DASDPS), 2014). This board was established 
as a forum for combatant commanders, services and defense agencies as a forum for 
furthering OCS capabilities and resources and maturing the OCS capability. Under this 
initiative, the amount of new DOTMLPF-P initiatives and results are too numerous to list 
here. Many of these resources will be reviewed throughout this project. 
2. 2013 NDAA 
Related to the 2013 NDAA contractor planning is now included in the Joint 
Military Education (JPME) for senior leaders. OCS oriented curriculum embedded into 
JPME provides each service a level of inherent institutional knowledge to leverage within 
the operational planning process and benefits from leaders exposure to the OCS 
discipline.  
Significantly, section 845 requires the incorporation of OCS into the readiness 
reporting systems further cementing OCS into peacetime activities. The Army supports 
this objective with exercises like the Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise led by 
the Expeditionary Contracting Command, and operational level OCS integration through 
major training centers like National Training Center, in Fort Irwin, CA. 
Finally, the NDAA required a DOD wide senior service who is responsible for 
many facets of OCS. These subordinate office OCS responsibilities include planning, 
assessment of total force, non-acquisition requirements determination, and determination 
of policy.  
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3. Cost-Consciousness in Contingency Contracting 
Recently, the concept of cost-consciousness has gained prominence as an issue in 
contingency contracting and is now taught in JPME courses. A report released to 
congress in 2012, titled Cost-Consciousness in Contingency Contracting reiterates the 
initiative to institutionalize OCS into the DOD citing cost-consciousness as, to use 
terminology found in MAAWS, commander’s business. The Commissions on Wartime 
Contracting’s 2011 final report first addressed the concept of “cost-consciousness” in 
contingency contracting. The report recommended agencies address cost-consciousness 
through assigning senior leaders responsible for this function and creating metrics to 
capture the value in contingency contracting. Legislation to reform contingency 
contracting was attempted, unsuccessfully in 2012, but this idea of cost-consciousness 
continues today. Most recently, the OCS Joint Concept identifies an increased cost-
consciousness in the overarching strategy and development of this Joint capability. 
The services can incorporate cost-consciousness in contingency contracting 
through, the report cites, “Better Buying Power.” This is an acquisition initiative that 
includes promoting competition in contracting and improving tradecraft for services 
contracting. This seems to indicate that cost-consciousness is primarily an acquisition 
function. Integrating contracting with the planning process early allows the contracting 
officer(s) the ability to promote cost-consciousness by developing a competitive and 
appropriate market/vendor base in a new theater of operations. The remainder of this 
project focuses on the planning phase as, this is key to creating cost-consciousness and 
preventing fraud, waste and abuse in contingency contracting. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the evolution of OCS throughout inception to the present. 
Throughout American military history, contractors supplied needed goods and services to 
the armed forces. First, the chapter describes the ad-hoc roots of OCS, through the 
emergence of Army doctrine integrating contractors onto the battlefield. Then it describes 
the development of contingency contracting reform during major combat operations. It 
next noted the institutionalization of OCS through the introduction of a planning 
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framework and the supporting evolution of Joint and Army resource. Finally, it reviews 
the vision and plan for the next evolution of Joint OCS operations. The next chapter will 
discuss and evaluate relevant current doctrine. Each service is faced with defining what 
institutionalizing operational contract support means for their operational and tactical 
levels. They have the benefit of reviewing the historical perspective and emergence of 
this field since Joint and Army forces have developed this doctrine.  
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III. EXAMINATION OF CURRENT DOCTRINE AND 
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT  
PLANNING RESOURCES 
Understanding the current level of planning doctrine and process capability for 
Operational Contract Support (OCS) will help organizations develop or improve their 
doctrinal OCS procurement processes. This chapter will evaluate current Joint force and 
Army planning doctrine for OCS. I will analyze existing doctrine for OCS planning tasks 
through two models, the recognized Three Pillars for Integrative success by E. Cory 
Yoder (2013) and the Contract Management Maturity model by Dr. Rene Rendon (2005). 
This chapter will contribute to an understanding of the current maturity level of 
Operational Contract Support (OCS). 
A. MODELS 
The following review of current doctrine and contracting structures focuses on 
what is relevant to a single service OCS construct. This research will also discuss the 
assessment results by providing insight on gaps and trends at the operational level in an 
attempt to characterize the current state of doctrinal OCS planning procedures outside of 
Joint operations. Much of the doctrine was incepted and written during major stability 
combat operations and created a structure to address on-going tactical level execution 
issues. Criticism surrounding the execution of OCS documents the original failure of the 
service’s planning processes and lack of institutional knowledge as a causal factor in the 
rates of fraud, waste and abuse observed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the focus 
here is extracting the planning guidance, review for operational level planning efficacy, 
and evaluating through two acquisition focused models. The assessment results and 
related recommendations for OCS doctrinal planning process improvement will guide the 
non-acquisition logistical planners in developing a road map for either developing 
similar, or improving current, OCS planning process doctrine. 
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1. Contracting Management Maturity Model 
In 2003, Dr. Rene Rendon developed the Contract Management Maturity  
Model © (CMMM) as a method to assess the maturity of contract management processes 
within an organization (Rendon, 2004). CMMM provides organizational leaders a tool to 
map and transform a procurement process, like planning for OCS, from tactical to more 
integrated and optimized levels (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). The author focuses on 
measuring the maturity of a process in practice within an organization through the issuing 
of surveys and measuring the responses. The model used in this project does not issue 
surveys; rather it measures the available doctrine, personnel structures and platforms for 
maturity. Understanding the maturity of available OCS resources can assist planners and 
doctrine writers with developing similar strategies, or new ones depending on the 
maturity, in developing OCS resources within other organizations. 
The CMMM consists of 6 phases and five levels of maturity, as depicted in Figure 
5. This project requires only the planning phase (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). This phase 
involves determining, if, what to buy, how much, and when to, procure. For the 
simplicity of this project, this includes all of shaping activities from both an acquisition 
and non-acquisition perspective. In OCS and logistics, the shaping phase includes 
identifying capability gaps and developing a market base to procure needed services and 
commodities. 
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 Contract Management Maturity Model (C) Figure 5. 
 
This figure, found in the Contract Management Organizational Assessment Tools, is the 
CMMM (c) graphic supporting the model. This model rates the maturity of the contract 
management phases from planning through closeout (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
The levels of maturity are designed to reflect the level of competence of the 
specific process evaluated. The five levels of maturity range from Level 1”Ad Hoc” to 
optimized (Garrett & Rendon, 2005): 
Level 1:  Ad Hoc 
The ad hoc designation indicates an early or initial level of process maturity. 
Much like the early years of contingency contracting, ad hoc reflects a lack of, or mostly 
undeveloped, organization-wide processes even with continued use of the function. Ad-
hoc could include informal documentation of the process that leaders are not held 
accountable. 
Level 2: Basic 
This level of maturity reflects some basic planning processes within the 
organization. The organization lacks the requirements for consistent use of these 
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processes. The primary means to evaluate this level is through the use of surveys 
identifying personnel adherence to this level.  
Level 3: Structured 
Here, formally documented contract management processes are institutionalized 
throughout the organization. Further, these processes allow for a tailored approach to 
adjust for strategic considerations and/or operating environments. Senior leaders provide 
the guidance and direction for key contracting strategies and decisions. Again, this is 
established through the use of survey to determine the extent of the participation and 
inclusion of senior leader guidance. 
Level 4: Integrated 
The processes are ingrained into the core organizational processes and integrated 
throughout key offices. Within OCS, this includes the various staff sections and 
commanders.  
Level 5: Optimized 
The highest level of maturity includes the use of performance metrics, quality 
control over the process, and an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
contract management process. Process improvement is continuously informed by 
established lessons learned and best practices. Streamlining the process is considered and 
implemented by the organization.  
This method has been used to evaluate Army contracting processes within 
organizations assessing the Army Contracting Command (Rendon, 2010, Rendon, 2011). 
All levels, while somewhat subjective, provides general guidance on examining the 
maturity processes as presented in doctrine. The CMMM assessment results assist in 
guiding recommendations for contract management process improvement in developing a 
road map for increasing contract management process capability. 
2. Three Pillars for Integrative Success  
This highly regarded and utilized model by E. Cory Yoder incorporates tools 
designed for analyzing various aspects of contracting processes designed to achieve an 
efficient and effective mix of resources. The Three Integrative Pillars for Success (TIPS) 
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was originally published in Phase Zero Operations for Integrative Planning and  
included as a model in the Gansler Commission. The TIPS created an early contingency 
contracting model designed to guide activity development in the shaping phase 
operations. This model, depicted in Figure 6, analyzes three key aspects needed to 
optimally execute contingency contracting and integration of the function. The 
incorporation of this model into the research is intended to provide a framed approach in 
evaluating each area for phase 0 process maturity. Each of the three pillars: personnel, 
platforms and protocols will be evaluated across single service and supporting a Joint 
contingency lead service agency.  
 Three Integrative Pillars for Success Figure 6. 
 
This graphic presented in Naval Postgraduate School’s MN 4371 Acquisition and 
Contracting Policy class in summer quarter 2015 depicts the Three Integrative Pillars for 
Success (TIPS) model. This model is updates with the base of Authorizations and 
Appropriations, different than found in less recent publications (Yoder, 2015a). 
a. Personnel 
This first pillar provides the “critical link between personnel, rank, position, 
credential and capability” (Yoder, 2010b, p. 42). This pillar recognizes that an 
organization needs the right mix of credentialed personnel including both acquisition and 
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non-acquisition workforce. OCS is a spectrum of activities that incorporates more than 
logistical contracting tasks. Effective OCS planning and supporting OCS plans are 
developed through non-acquisition personnel integrating the plan throughout each staff 
section, requiring activity, commander, and engaging the acquisition staff early. 
Evaluating the pillar means looking at both the skills and mix of both acquisition and 
non-acquisition personnel. Also, personnel also include rating the level of integration of 
OCS across staffs in the planning process. Personnel includes all stakeholders influencing 
the planning process. 
The timing, mix and credentials of personnel in logistics planning during phase 0 
directly impacts the later stages of executing OCS ad contingency contracting. The 
Gansler Commission cited multiple personnel issues, including the lack of credentialed 
staff as a contributor to contracting management issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. Each 
service approaches both acquisition and non-acquisition/logistics career fields differently. 
Contracting officers are not the only key players in planning for contingencies. Pivotal 
stakeholders and influencers in OCS planning and operations are the non-acquisition 
workforce. These include acquisition planners, the requiring activity personnel, 
commanders, and policy-makers. Determining the appropriate credentials for both groups 
of personnel (acquisition and non-acquisition) to support OCS missions appropriate 
across all services can prevent the historical mistakes (in the Gansler Commission) and 
reduce the risk of fraud, waste and abuse. 
b. Platforms 
The second pillar of integrative success must work in harmony with the other 
pillars, personnel, and protocols. Platforms are the hardware, software and reporting 
systems enabling integration throughout the OCS process. These platforms proved the 
needed conduit for analysis, decision-making, and integration. Examples of these include 
Joint systems, like Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) now 
replaced by the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. 
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c. Protocols 
The third pillar, protocols, are defined as rules, regulations, and business 
processes that guide and define phase 0/shaping phase. Similar to the CMMM model, 
doctrine can range from unit standard operating procedures to formalized doctrine. The 
primary doctrine in OCS is the Joint Publication (JP) 4–10 Operational Contract Support. 
While single service missions using OCS might be less complex in scope and size, this 
regulation provides a good foundation to begin OCS planning. Additionally, any service 
embedded into a Joint operation task force requires an understanding of this framework 
and associated key players to “plug into” the logistics capabilities and assets. The lack of 
the OCS framework and knowledge could result in inefficiencies on the battlefield and 
risk redundancies in procuring for the supported mission. 
3. Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity Model for Operational 
Contract Support  
This project uses a hybrid of both the above described models (CMMM and 
TIPS) creating a frame to analyze existing OCS doctrine, personnel structures, and 
available platforms for maturity in recorded organization-wide planning procedures. The 
framework shown in Figure 7 reflects only the planning aspect of the CMMM model and 
utilizes the levels of maturity as a gauge for analyzing planning activities organized 
around the Three Pillars of Integrative Success. The TIPS pillars are modified to reflect 
personnel to include both acquisition and non-acquisition. The remaining pillars, 
protocols, and platforms remain non-acquisition as OCS planning named in Army 
doctrine as a logistical task. The purpose of the Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity 
Model (HIPMM) was to identify the level of maturity of current OCS planning guidance 
and resources. With this evaluation, I will recommend strategies suitable for multi-
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Level 1: Ad Hoc 
The ad hoc designation indicates an undefined level of OCS planning process 
maturity. An organization at this level lacks focused OCS planning resources and the 
inclusion of acquisition assets occurs on the identification of a requirement during 
mission execution. 
Level 2: Basic 
The basic maturity level indicates an early or initial stage of process maturity as 
reflected with the identification of some OCS planning resources within the organization. 
For example, acquisition member(s) are assigned to support an organization for only 
specific contingencies and are primarily responsible for OCS planning tasks. Further, the 
acquisition specific planning tasks identified may be defined by the attached or assigned 
acquisition staff versus the operational unit’s doctrine or procedures. The non-acquisition 
planner also is identified only in contingencies, and might be the logistician who works 
with the acquisition staff to carry out execution tasks including requirements generation 
and contract management. Platforms, formal or informal, are developed but not required. 
Level 3: Structured 
The structured level indicates that an organization has formally documented OCS 
planning resources developed and assigned across each pillar. The acquisition OCS 
planning personnel are identified and assigned to the organization during all phases of 
operations. The non-acquisition OCS planner, to include the logistician, are identified and 
documented, although not necessarily co-located with the acquisition personnel. The 
planning protocols include both acquisition specific and logistical tasks. Finally, planning 
platforms are developed, and required during the planning process. 
Level 4: Integrated 
The integrated level reflects a process maturity that includes OCS planning tasks 
throughout different office and functions in an organization beyond solely logistical and 
acquisition concerns. Organization doctrine or standard operating procedures include the 
recognition of working board, task groups, or an inclusion of OCS considerations in 
forums that include all staff elements. These tasks could include key staff offices, 
requiring activities, and an inclusion of commander’s guidance early into the OCS 
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planning process. Additionally, external stakeholders and their concerns are recognized in 
doctrine, procedures, communications and working groups. At the integrated level, OCS 
planning is enabled by acquisition personnel permanently assigned to a supported 
organizational throughout all phases and working with an identified non-acquisition OCS 
planner. Finally, the planning platforms enabling this function are both required and 
integrated into the organizational processes. 
Level 5: Optimized 
The highest level of maturity fully integrates OCS considerations with the 
assigned acquisition personnel, non-acquisition planners, supporting staff and 
stakeholders into the planning process. This level of optimization within an organization 
is enabled through permanently assigned acquisition staff integrated into the supported 
unit’s staff during all phases of operations. The non-acquisition OCS planner is 
permanently assigned to the organization’s staff working to integrate the function across 
all other staff and stakeholders. This trained and validated OCS focused planner provides 
continuous staff and commander support for shaping phase operations to include 
readiness exercises. The supporting doctrine identifies and defines performance metrics 
that continuously improves the OCS planning process and outcomes. Finally, a lessons 
learned platform, in addition to OCS planning platforms, is integrated into the core 
organizational process. 
In conclusion, the above Hybrid Model, HIPMM, will be used to analyze the 
available OCS planning doctrine, personnel structures, and platforms available in Joint 
and Army OCS and contingency contracting arenas. The intent of this project is develop 
an understood maturity of the available OCS planning tools, as various organizations may 
use these tools as models for developing their own OCS capabilities. Evaluating the OCS 
planning tools starts with first understanding the current Joint OCS framework and is 
necessary to build a common vocabulary. 
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B. OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT FRAMEWORK 
1. OCS Definition and Framework (JP 4–10) 
Joint Publication (JP) 4–10 Operational Contract Support is the primary doctrine 
for Joint force OCS related operations. Each military department supports OCS and the 
combatant commander by preparing to act as both the requiring activity and the 
contracting task authority CJCS, 2014). While the OCS framework is not prescribed for 
single service operational use, the doctrine can inform and shape effective supporting 
doctrine and best practices. The basic principles of OCS describe that Phase 0 
significantly impacts all stages of an operation, underscoring the need of all services to 
prepare and institutionalize this function for Joint operation preparedness.  
a. 2014 Contingency Contracting and Operational Contract Support 
Definition 
The release of the 2014 version of the Joint Publication Operational Contract  
Support finds both the terms OCS and contingency contracting separately defined.  
Contingency contracting is a subset of OCS and includes the process of 
contracting for supplies, services, and construction from commercial 
sources in support of contingency operations. Contingency contracting, by 
definition, is conducted by contracting officers warranted under authorities 
granted to the Services, CSAs, and functional CCMDs under Title 10, 
USC, in accordance with (IAW) rules established in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS), Service FAR supplements (Title 48, Code of 
Federal Regulations and applicable contingency contracting acquisition 
instructions. (CJCS, 2014, p I-4) 
This implies that contingency contracting can be executed and managed without 
the OCS hierarchy in a single service construct. Leading an OCS function in a Joint 
command requires an understanding of the framework. OCS as a process of planning for 
and obtaining supplies occurs in a framework of three pillars appropriate for any phase of 
the operation (CJCS, 2014c).   
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b. OCS Planning Framework 
The OCS planning framework separates the process into three functions requiring 
separate, but cohesive planning products. The three functions are depicted in Figure 8. 
 Operational Contract Support Framework Figure 8. 
 
The OCS planning framework as depicted in Joint Publication 4–10 Operational 
Contract Support released in 2014. The three supporting functions are critical to OCS 




Contract Support Integration 
The first pillar requires an understanding of the operational environment and 
stakeholders (requiring activity, multinational players and effect of OCS across each 
staff) integrating through OCS-related working groups. These efforts are intended to 
extend across multi-disciplinary teams ensuring that each staff, stakeholder, and agency 
articulates their function, capability or need for consideration in the OCS planning 
process. The publication emphasizes that OCS planning is an operational, and not 
specifically an acquisition effort.  
Contracting Support  
The second pillar focuses on planning the actual function of contracting support 
from requirements identification through contract closeout. This is carried out by both 
acquisition and non-acquisition personnel. Requirements determination in JP 4–10: 
“encompasses all activities necessary to develop, consolidate, coordinate, validate, 
approve, and prioritize Joint force contract support requirements. Requirements 
determination is an operational command function (who can designate a lead requiring 
activity to conduct this function), not a contracting activity function” (CJCS, 2014, p. I-
4). This has skill set implications at the operational staff level discussed in the analysis 
section. 
Contractor Management  
This function emphasizes the need to include into a plan how to manage (and 
sustain for) the amount of contractors required for an operation. The responsibility for 
deliberately planning and executing this task, in JP 4–10, needs to be integrated early 
across the staff which is primarily a non-acquisition staff function. Figure 9, found in 
Joint Publication 4-10, provides a an example of OCS contractor management planning 
tasks and risk assessment opportunities as integrated across a joint staff  (CJCS, 2014, p. 
V2).  
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 Contractor Management Staff Tasks Figure 9. 
 
The OCS planning framework supporting contractor management staff tasks as depicted 
in Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract Support released in 2014 (CJCS, 2014, 
p .V-3). 
The three pillars provide a context to develop the OCS supporting plan both in a 
Joint or single service construct. The integration of OCS across stakeholders provides 
consistency of thought in planning for OCS and managing contractors on the battlefield. 
This occurs on both the Joint Task Force level, as well as apply to a service-specific 
operational staff. The contract support pillar provides the emphasis to any level staff 
utilizing OCS, that the requirements determination process is part of a larger scope, and 
lead by the requiring activity/supported unit/task force. Finally, that managing and 
supporting contractors emphasized as it is part of the cost and needs be considered as a 
deliberate activity.  
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2. Contracting Roles 
Each service must decide what role, or levels of roles are appropriate for a 
mission and develop the needed supporting OCS acquisition and non-acquisition 
structures. JP 4–10 covers the roles and responsibilities within the context of an 
operation. A service can play one of three roles in an operation as designated by the 
geographic combatant commander. The designation of each, which does not necessarily 
happen in single service lead contingencies, depends on the complexity, length and other 
factors. The establishment of a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (J-TSCC)  
is described more in detail within Army doctrine, and later in the chapter. The 
understanding here is that integration becomes more complex as the number of services 
and international players become involved. This circumstance requires a different skill set 
for a short term Lead Service Contracting Command (LCSS) in a limited contingency 
versus the JTSCC as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a significant distinction 
between the LSCC and the Lead Service for Contracting (LCS). The LCSS retains the 
responsibility for contracting with their own service versus the LCSS where a service 
taking on the coordination responsibility for all services. For each service to act as an 
LSCC, a core set of personnel with the appropriate skills and access to common 
platforms is key. The remainder of this current doctrine review assumes that each service 
can create the LSCC capability, not necessarily the J-TSCC.  
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 Joint OCS Roles of Services  Figure 10. 
 
The graphic depicts the roles that the services can take in OCS planning and execution a 
Joint operational environment as found in Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract 
Support. (CJCS, 2014, pp. IV-I). 
3. Major Contract Types 
Single-service lead operations are characterized by one of three contract types, as 
identified by JP 4–10. These contract types are typically referred to in Joint and Army 
doctrine, and the differences between the two require a different approach and role in 
planning. Primarily, single service contingences would nest with external support 
contract vehicles in phase, or create a theater support contract  
a. Theater Support Contracts   
Most significantly, regardless of acquisition structure within the services, each 
one executes some level of theater support contracts. These types of contracts apply to 
both large and small operations though, while they are most associated with recent 
contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although, each service is not currently 
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manned to maintain the lead service for a contingency operation that executes all needed 
theater support contracts for an operational area. 
b. External Support Contracts  
These contracts are associated with external agencies with unique contracting 
authority. The civil augmentation programs (CAPs), include Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and requires integration into an operation with a 
logistics plan   
c. Systems Support Contracts  
OCS is also utilized to support major weapon’s systems, to include repair parts 
and fielding activities. These two are required as integration into a major combat 
operation. 
4. Phases of an Operation 
The newly released JP 4–10 (Figure 11) now aligns the phases of notional 
operational contract support phases with those in JP 3–0 Operations (Figure 12). The 
various contracting authorities are arranged by level of effort from Joint Publication 3–0, 
Operations. Notably, the levels of military effort culminate in phases III and IV in both 
charts. This implies, that planning for contractor management needs to account for the 
highest levels of operational ground employment.   
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 Phases of a Joint Operation Figure 11. 
 
Operational phases as depicted in Joint Publication 3–0 Operations released in 2011 
(CJCS, 2011, p. V-6). 
 Operational Contract Support Phases Figure 12. 
 
The phases of OCS execution with the projected military effort overlaid into the phases 
as depicted in Joint Publication 4–10 (CJCS, 2014, p. I-12). The newest release of JP 4–
10 now includes Phase 0, also known as the shaping phase. 
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JP 4–10’s depiction of the phases of effort describe an essential to types of 
contracts employed by phase. Differentiating between these types of contracts is key for 
any logistical planner to understand when employing OCS into their operational plans. 
The planning phase added the Phase 0, or shaping phase, now aligning the phases of OCS 
processes to operational processes. The publication also defines phase 0 and provides an 
emphasis on the critical nature of OCS planning and phase 0 activates on impacting the 
operational outcomes of a given mission. 
Phase 0 (Shape). Shape phase missions are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries, 
develop relationships with, and assure multinational partners, as well as to set conditions 
for the successful execution of contingency plans and are generally conducted through 
security cooperation activities. Significant OCS-related phase 0 actions include 
establishment of contract-related boards, cells, and working groups; gathering OCS 
analysis of the operational environment information; deliberate planning; and support to 
security cooperation activities. Contract support to security cooperation activities is 
generally characterized by low dollar, short-term, locally awarded contracts executed 
IAW peacetime contracting procedures. OCS security cooperation actions support 
deliberate OCS planning actions by providing U.S. forces experience and knowledge of 
the local commercial vendor base and general business climate. (CJCS, 2014, p. I-11)  
Phase 0 encompasses more than simply requirements generation activities. In the 
2013 article Phase Zero Contracting Operations—Strategic and Integrative Planning for 
Contingency and Expeditionary Operations by E. Cory Yoder and Dayne E. Nix identify 
Phase 0 as a cyclical process. Here, the intent of Phase 0 is to encompass all activities 
from planning through contract closeout, as depicted in Figure 13. This means that Phase 
0 activities range not just capability gap identification and requirements generation, but 
also includes developing viable contract vehicles, contract administration and anticipation 
of claims. For an operational planner, this brings the idea of cost-consciousness to the 
forefront of planning. As, the true cost of a contract is not just the awarded price, but the 
hours spent by the operational force to oversee that contract and possible remediation 
issues for subpar performing contractors. The article also proposes a three-tier model 
including an integrated planner and executer which is covered in the next chapter 
describing current Phase 0 best practices. 
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 Notional Contracting Phase 0 Model Figure 13. 
 
This contingency contracting phase 0 model found in the 2013 Defense Acquisition 
Research Journal article Phase Zero Contracting Operations. This model recognizes that 
phase 0 as an iterative process incorporating all operational phases from planning through 
closeout (Nix & Yoder, 2013, p. 360). 
The shaping phase, phase 0 can significantly impact the operational battlefield, 
later stages of the operation, and the final budget outcome. In fact, JP 4–10 states that a 
lack of emphasis on this function in phase 0 is a major hindrance in the planning process. 
This newly added phase requires further definition and understanding of what tasks need 
to be executed to best leverage OCS capabilities. The services continue to collect best 
practices and lessons learned to better understand how OCS affects the battlefield 
economically, fulfill the warfighters needs and avoid fraud, waste and abuse. Currently, 
several common products assist operational level missions and Joint planning to create 
feasible OCS plans. These products are discussed below in the examination of OCS 
planning protocols. 
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C. EXAMINATION OF CURRENT DOCTRINE AND OCS PLANNING 
RESOURCES 
1. OCS Current Planning Resource Analysis Personnel Pillar 
 The use of planning and integration cells determines the eventual success of OCS 
within a theater of operations, as stated in Joint Publication 4–10, Operational Contract 
Support. Organizational OCS planning and execution is enabled by OCS trained and 
functional personnel structures tailored to each mission. These cells are not mandated as 
organic to operational units although they are designed for ongoing operations at the 
combatant command. Given that operational planning is stated as a non-contracting 
function, these cells and personnel include non-acquisition OCS planning professionals. 
Understanding these structures are important to embedding into joint operations and to 
develop relevant single-service operational planning structures. Additionally, when 
directed by the geographic combatant commander, the services are generally responsible 
for OCS activities. 
a. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 
The Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), established in 2008, 
provides operational and strategic OCS support through deployable teams. They assist all 
levels across the DOD from combatant commanders in synchronizing to integrating OCS 
activities into specific operations. Located under the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
this is an ‘on-call’ OCS enabler fills a needed capability in deliberate and crises action 
planning through embedded OCS planners and formed cells. JCASO assists in 
institutionalizing OCS across the DOD and provides subject matter experts assisting 
combatant command, OCS lead service designees and single service lead missions with 
development. Best practices and analysis of a JCASO OCS planner role as embedded 
within a combatant command Joint Task Forces staff is reviewed in the next chapter. 
b. OCS Integration Cell 
This permanent cell embedded in the combatant command primarily plans, 
coordinates, and integrates OCS-related functions across the staff. According to Joint 
Publication 4-10, the Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC) are 
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responsible for “gathering and analyzing information”, framing the operational 
environment in terms of OCS using tools like Political, Military, Economic, Social, 
Infrastructure and Information (PMESII ) analysis (CJCS, 2014, p. G-1). This includes 
elements of the business environment to include capacity, currency, banking capabilities, 
vendor lists, and the identification of contract vehicles available.  The resulting products 
include The OCSIC should publish its priority countries, OCS analysis data requirements, 
frequency of reporting, and duties of the Service components in the GCC’s theater 
campaign plan (CJCS, 2014, p. G-1). The structure of the staff is not prescribed, but the 
expectation is that the members of the staff have operational OCS experience and can 
embed/guide a subordinate Joint Forces Command. JP 4–10 mentions that the OCSIC has 
two JCASO representatives, which depending on the combatant command is a permanent 
asset aligned within the staff. These cells have performed functions from conducting 
drawdown operations for United Stated Forces Command-Afghanistan to planning and 
facilitating OCS actions in recent operation United Assistance in Liberia.  
c. Army Personnel OCS Structures 
(1) Acquisition personnel contracting structures: Army Contracting 
Command/Expeditionary Contracting Command 
Creating OCS supporting personnel structures in any service requires an 
understanding of the Army contracting structures, as they often provide lead contracting 
duties in many Joint operations. The U.S. Army’s Contracting Command as well as 
Expeditionary Contracting Command are recognized throughout the DOD as primary 
contracting enablers that provide fast and responsive support for contingencies ranging 
from small and short duration missions to large stability operations (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2014). The ACC defines successful warfighter capability 
fulfillment as an integrated contracting network. This network includes the customer, or 
requiring activity, the contracting workforce, the supporting contracting process, and 
industry partners. The Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) provides OCS 
planning and phase 0 support to both combatant commands and operational units. 
According to the United States Army Contracting Command in a presentation in 
February 2015, the execution of OCS operations in Fiscal Year 14 alone had included 
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over 181 missions in over 52 countries. Contingency support has been provided through a 
hierarchy of acquisition-specific structures. 
The ECC’s acquisition structure is designed to support different sizes of the 
army’s operational units as described in Figure 14 from Army Technical Publication 4-
92, Contracting to Support Unified Land Operations (Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 2014). The ECC’s subordinate unit, the Contract Support Brigade (CSB), is 
aligned with a combatant command. This alignment creates a habitual relationship in 
which the CSB acts as the lead contracting provider for the combatant command’s 
associated operating area. Contracting Support Battalions provide OCS for their assigned 
theater, field Army, or corps, habitually. The base unit of the contracting structure is the 
contingency contracting team (CCT) designed to provide support to a brigade-sized 
element. However, the unit is not necessarily habitually assigned to any specific brigade 
or unit during shaping operations. Discussed in later chapters are the ongoing brigade 
level operational readiness exercises that practice OCS support.  
 Army Contracting Command’s Basic Acquisition to  Figure 14. 
Non-acquisition Supporting Structures 
 
The intended alignment of acquisition to non-acquisition contingency contracting 
structures, in the above figure, is found in Army Doctrine Contracting Support to  
Unified Land Operations released in 2014 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014,  
p. 1-12).  
Single services can adapt established Army contracting structures to fit small and 
mid-sized expeditionary operations. The 2014 Army Techniques Publication 4–92, 
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Contracting to Support Unified Land Operations, states that contracting support for 
small-scale operations at a tactical level are met through organic assets. Pre-arranged 
contracting vehicles fulfill small capability gaps using established Field Ordering 
Officers in possession of Government Purchase Cards (GPC) instead of deploying 
contracting personnel. Contracting for larger needs in an expeditionary environment 
requires adding non-organic contracting assets to supported Army units. 
Contracting with commercial sources in expeditionary environments requires a 
contracting structure, or team, to work directly with the supported unit. ECC provides 
contracting authority and expeditionary support by deploying contracting teams. In Fiscal 
Year 13, over 490 individual contingency contracting officers were deployed to 60 
countries. These teams derived contracting authority from the established ECC 
acquisition structure whose personnel are certified in contracting by the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWAI). Deploying contracting assets 
requires a basis of oversight and contracting authority separate from command authority 
and backed by the appropriate DAWAI certified contracting officers.  
Operating in a significantly resource-constrained environment puts more pressure 
on ACC/ECC to determine how best to enable contracting support across multiple 
organizations. Several challenges face the organization as force reduction plans are 
implemented:  
Declining resources that require ‘hard choices.’ 
Workforce demographics: 50% have less than 5 years of experience. 
Post Afghanistan contracting requires retooling/readjusting strategic and 
operational approaches 
Increased oversight and regulations:  
(i) 4,000 audits in 4 years 
(ii) 450 Federal and Defense acquisition rule changes 
(iii)Emerging Missions and resource constraints (United States Army 
Contracting Command, 2015) 
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Funding cuts to the ACC/ECC as a whole can reduce the capabilities of an already 
taxed contracting structure. The risk in moving to a smaller contracting asset structure is 
that it decreases the availability of personnel to conduct contract administration and 
closeout prior to the end of an expeditionary operation. In a cost-conscious environment, 
contract administration and claims accrue additional real and transactional costs, 
increasing the overall cost of the mission beyond the awarded price of a contract. 
Within the HIPMM, ACC as an organization is optimized because it consistently 
adjusts protocols to adapt to a new operational environment, and provides permanently 
assigned staff/units to support major Army commands throughout Phase 0. This allows 
the contracting organization to provide the needed Contracting Authority: the ACC can 
respond to any size contingency by deploying an appropriate contracting asset depending 
on mission needs. Single services can look to Army for such best practices to support the 
development of their own OCS structures. First, providing dedicated acquisition 
resources that are centrally funded and located provides a focal point to create an 
effective contracting structure. Second, developing an acquisition workforce that supports 
professional development and promulgates lessons learned throughout the workforce 
assists in creating an integrated structure. Additionally, all personnel should understand 
how ACC/ECC fit into a Joint operation as they often lead the OCS aspect of Joint 
services. 
(2) Non-Acquisition: Operational Contracting Support Officer  
The Non-Acquisition: Operational Contracting Support Officer (OCSO) is a skill 
identifier assigned to Army operational-level representing non-acquisition personnel 
knowledgeable in the OCS process. A key link between planning and executing a 
contingency is the non-acquisition and logistics planner. The United States Army 
established the OCSO skill identifier and course in response to the OCS non-acquisition 
capability gap. The course prepares non-acquisition mid-grade officers and non-
commissioned officers to work as operational level logistical planners that are 
knowledgeable about the OCS process. OCSO or 3CI is a designator and additional duty 
assigned to staff members in the Army’s modular units such as Brigade Support 
Battalions (BSBs) and Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs.) Full-time positions have 
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been intended, in the original plan, for theater support units and Army support 
commands. The skill identifier is not limited to logistics personnel but integrates across 
staffs including Communications Officers and key field grade planning slots such as the 
Support Operations Officer.  
The Army is institutionalizing OCS into the non-acquisition workforce by training 
and credentialing OCS planners within tactical units. The Army Logistics University 
administers and credentials the 3CI Army Skill Identifier, which indicates OCS training. 
This course appears to cover tactical level OCS execution and touches on the Joint-
planning framework and key requirements for generating documents. From an 
operational planning perspective, this course reviews OCS in the Military Decision 
Making Process (MDMP) and spends time on ethical and legal considerations. Outside of 
doctrine, participants are exposed to the effects of OCS on the battlefield. This includes 
an introduction to the Money as a Weapon System and the risk of unintended 
consequences on the battlefield in the form of corruption and a local disruption of the 
economy. Joint planning documents are also discussed such as the OCS Annex W. On 
completion of the course, graduates receive the skill identifier notated on their personnel 
service records. 
From a non-acquisition perspective, this course and the embedded skill identifier 
provide the needed focus at the operational level to institutionalize OCS across the Army. 
The doctrinal primary duties of these planners include many supported unit functions: 
 
Advise commander and staff regarding OCS matters. 
Coordinate and manage unit OCS training. 
Integrate OCS matters/requirements among the staff. 
Participate in unit operational planning teams to apply OCS expertise to the 
planning process. 
Develop, review: Statements of Work (SOW)/Performance Work Statements 
(PWSs), Independent Government Estimates (IGEs), requirement 
justification documentation, and purchase requests. 
Coordinate staffing and submittal of requirements packages. 
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Monitor, track and coordinate required unit actions associated with: 
Requirements package processing, awarded contracts, contracting officer 
representatives and receiving officials, and interface with supporting 
contracting activities, such as Contingency Contracting Teams (CCT)s and 
Regional Contracting Offices (RCOs). (Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 2011, p. 2–5)  
Currently, OCSO provides a first step to train non-acquisition personnel, at an 
operational level, to become active and informed OCS participants. At the operational 
level, previous efforts to plan and execute contingency contracting relied on the 
interactions between the assigned acquisition staff and the supported unit during the 
mission. Now, non-acquisition education fulfills the Gansler Commission’s capability 
gap by providing operational units the planning tools. As the force enters focused initial 
entry operations in a post-Iraq and Afghanistan era, the need for these planners will 
increase.  
Within the HIPMM, non-acquisition personnel structures are rated as integrated 
level. This level was assessed because now OCS planners still being assigned to Army 
units and then trained. Optimization in the model occurs when this course and the trained 
personnel are fully integrated into Army personnel. Once the slots are created and filled 
with 3C designated individuals, the rating will become optimized. Overall, formally 
trained OCS non-acquisition personal integrated throughout each Army tactical level unit 
begins to institutionalize this function throughout the force. Other services can use a 
similar tactic, identifying key personnel needed to plan OCS into operations and provide 
them the needed formal training to accomplish this mission. 
d. Conclusion: 
The evaluation of Joint Forces OCS planning acquisition and non-acquisition 
personnel structures reflects a HIPMM optimized rating. Within a joint task force 
environment, the permanent assignment and integration of the Army Contracting 
Command’s Contract Support Brigades provide an optimized structure. The ACC 
provides flexible contracting solutions for the assignment Combatant Commander and 
associated Joint Task Forces as supported units. Similarly, the permanent assignment of 
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non-acquisition OCS planning focused working boards and ongoing assignment of 
personnel in the JCASO office provides an optimized rating.  
The evaluation of Army Forces OCS planning acquisition and non-acquisition 
personnel structures reflects a staggered HIPMM rating. At an operational level, the 
alignment of the acquisition structure, the Contracting Battalion, with major operational 
commands provides OCS shaping resources and earns a HIPMM optimized rating. The 
development of the Operational Contract Support Officer 3C skill identifier as a duty 
within the operational unit staff will provide an optimized structure once the slotting and 
education is completed. Until then, the non-acquisition planners are integrated based on 
individual commands structures. This researcher did not query each of the supported 
commands for the identification of these structures outside of a joint task force construct. 
So, the assumption is this is filled, and the resulting evaluated level is integrated.  
2. Examination of Current Doctrine and OCS Platform Planning 
Resources  
Many of the systems available for OCS planning can range from informal systems 
to larger Joint focused systems. Some of the available Joint systems and contractor 
planning systems are briefly covered and explained. 
a. Adaptive Planning and Execution  
The Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) is the Department of Defense 
(DOD) primary platform for planning a theater campaign in Joint environments assumes 
that the planning process is ongoing. For OCS, this implies that contingency contracting 
is not to be reactive and requires constant planning throughout all phases, instead of 
being constrained to planning in phase 0 (Sweeney, 2013). 
b. Joint Lessons Learned Program/Information System 
The Joint Lessons Learned Program/Information System (JLLIS) platform is an 
effort to collect lessons learned and share OCS-related experiences. Combatant 
commands and Joint forces collect this data and which is then shared with other 
organizations. The Government Accountability Office reports that combatant commands 
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and the Army are making and improving efforts to collect OCS lessons learned. 
Currently, efforts are being made towards requiring all services to fully develop service 
specific OCS guidance (Russell, 2015). 
c. Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker  
The Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system is 
intended to store contract and contractor information for contingency operations. This 
system applies not only to Joint operation, but to any acquisition over $100,000 with 
contractors deployed more than thirty days. The ability to track and manage contractors 
ultimately assists the commander in making informed decisions directly affecting the 
battlefield. 
d. Summary 
The platforms discussed reflect an optimized level of support as multiple systems 
are required and linked into the core organization processes. The OCS planning platforms 
available include contractor accountability, development of informed and integrated 
across staff OCS plans, and the sharing of lessons learned. The diversity of systems 
reflects the trend to integrate OCS across staff, stakeholders and supported units. 
Conclusive evidence that combatant commands and service components use these 
systems consistently was not available at the time of writing this MBA project.  
3. OCS Current Planning Resource Analysis Protocol Pillar 
The amount of Operational Contract Support focused products is extensive, to 
include the following: financial management guidance, published standard operating 
procedures, logistics planning, task lists, commissions reviewing ongoing operations, and 
lessons learned. The following doctrine/protocol analysis focuses on a few key 
Department of Defense level OCS planning guidance documents and Army specific 
doctrine. The evaluation of protocol will do two things, first to understand what 
planning/phase 0 considerations have developed. Second, to evaluate the Army’s 
available protocols for maturity within this project’s specific, HIPMM model. 
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This project uses three strategies to evaluate and determine the OCS tasks relevant 
to all services. First, I review each document for specific phase 0 definitions and tasks. 
Second, I extract key tasks directed to combatant commanders as possibly relevant to a 
service specific, operational level commander. Finally, I conclude by reviewing the stated 
tasks listed as relevant to phase 0 operations. The limitation of this doctrine/protocol 
review is in the date of publication as this is important in understanding the assumptions 
of each document. All documents were published prior to the end of major operations in 
Afghanistan and still need analysis for efficacy in post Afghanistan/Iraq operations that 
include initial entry, versus entering into a mature stability focused theater.  
a. Guidance for Employment of the Force  
The Guidance for Employment for the Force (GEF) is the highest level protocols 
providing strategic guidance for planning including contingency contracting (Sweeney, 
2013). This assists in linking the strategic view and goals to the operational plan. 
Significantly, this guidance requires planning for OCS in all phases of the operation, 
similar to the Yoder Phase 0 model. The combatant commanders assigned to develop a 
contracting plan for a joint task for can delegate this function to any service. The assigned 
service is required to develop a specific contingency plan.  
The adaptive planning assumed into the GEF processes creates a need for 
proactive OCS throughout the entirety of the operations process. The combatant 
commander retains the capability to revise plans quickly through the assumption that 
planning is ongoing. Within an OCS context, creating, adapting and revising real time 
missions required on-going situational awareness of the effects of contracting on the 
battlefield and how those changes affect the budget.  
b. Joint Publication 4–10 Operational Contract Support 
JP 4–10 version 2014 (CJCS, 2014) built on the 2008 version creates a framework 
providing OCS planning solutions. A key change/addition to this doctrine was the 
addition of phase 0 or the shaping phase, now aligning with the planning phases in 
operational planning doctrine. The addition of the shaping phase to the OCS notional 
phase model highlights the importance of planning, training, and exercising for OCS 
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throughout the force. OCS readiness was mandated in the 2013 National Defense 
Authorization Act and still requires further definition to successfully incorporate into 
training exercises. Although, the meaning of this readiness, and at what level this is 
appropriate, is still be determined. The various Joint and Army OCS and contingency 
contracting exercises will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
c. Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41 Operational Contract 
Support (2011) 
The institutionalization of OCS into the DOD and service components begins 
with developed doctrine. This Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) originally 
published in 2005 and re-released in 2011 sets policies and procedures for OCS. The 
applicability includes all DOD operations as directed by the combatant commander, and 
all DOD components. This document established planning OCS actions to include fully 
considering planning, integration, and execution as directed by the combatant 
commander. This document identifies key OCS focal points and responsibilities for 
doctrine development and planning. The document established a DOD level emphasis on 
the importance of developing comprehensive OCS plans providing a vision. 
OCS Vision: optimize operational unity of effort by analyzing existing 
and projected theater support and external support contracts to minimize, 
reduce, and eliminate redundant and overlapping requirements and 
contracted capabilities. (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), 2011, p. 42)  
Reducing waste, redundancy of effort, and achieving efficiency through creating unity of 
effort requires an OCS strategy and phase 0 preparations. The institutionalization of OCS 
into the DOD and service components begins with developed doctrine.  
COCOM OCS planning considerations are described through the document. 
These recommended OCS combatant command level planning tasks can easily adapted 
into single service led phase 0 activities. Additionally, this doctrine prescribes specific 
planning considerations into developed policy, doctrine, training and operations. The 
named tasks required by the combatant commander to subordinate service components is 
depicted in Figure 15 (USD[AT&L], 2011, p. 41).  
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 Operational Contract Support tasks for Operational Commanders Figure 15. 
OCS commander’s tasks updated from Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 
3020.41 Operational Contract Support dated 2011 (DODI, 2011, pp. 41-44). 
Shaping phase planning activities can assist in fulfilling the above tasks in support 
of contingency operations. First, that personnel are appropriately trained and proficient in 
developing acquisition requirement documentation. Additionally, the supporting 
contractor management plan too, is resourced with the appropriate organic oversight 
capability. Finally, that all planning occurred in an integrated environment including 
intelligence analysis and contractor vetting and personnel reporting procedures are 
normalized across the staff. While prescribed to subordinate commander’s participating 
in a Joint operation, they can be easily adapted into lower level OCS policies. More tasks 
can be extracted for service specific tasks through analyzing combatant commander’s 
responsibilities.  
1. “Plan and execute OCS program management, contract support 
integration, and contractor management actions in all applicable contingency 
operations in their [Area of Operation.]” 
 
2. “Identify military capabilities shortfalls in all the joint warfighting 
functions that require contracted solutions.” 
Identifying capabilities gaps during phase 0 with a contingency contracting officer 
available can influence and better inform operational plans.  
 
3.  “Conduct integrated planning to determine and synchronize contract support 
requirements to facilitate OCS planning.” 
Identify and incorporate sources of supply for identified capabilities gaps to include 
interagency sourcing to narrow the OCS contracting solutions. 
 
4. “Develop acquisition-ready requirements documents as identified in CSIPs 
including Performance Work Statements, IGEs, task order change documents, and 
sole source justifications.” 
This is the responsibility of typically the requiring activity staff, and is an important 
step in conducting contingency contracting. 
 
5. “Integrate OCS into mission rehearsals and training exercises.”  
Developing and integrating the OCS function into an organization’s core processes 
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d. Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures 4–10 Operational Contract 
Support 
The Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) for Operational Contract 
Support first emerged in 2011. The pre-Gansler Commission lineage of this 1999 
document focuses on the contractor’s on the battlefield emphasis in contingency 
contracting. The 2011 version, released during ongoing stability operations articulates 
OCS actions surrounding Relief In Place/Transfer of Authority.  
This document is a key document in applicability of OCS doctrine to other 
services. The stated intent is to inform Brigade and above commanders and staff in 
executing OCS in full spectrum operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2011a). At the time of writing this thesis, a multi-service version of this document is in 
the works and soon-to-be-released. As a result, I will briefly overview this document, and 
provide critical analysis of what the document is missing from an operational planning 
perspective, as compared to the previously reviewed Army OCS doctrine.  
The Army Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Operational Contract Support 
first emerged in 2011. This document describes at a tactical level standard tactics, 
techniques and procedures developed for OCS aimed at commanders and non-acquisition 
personnel. This begins with a distilled OCS framework and process from JP 4–10, 
described earlier in this chapter while expanding on best practices. The overall process is 
aptly described in Figure 16.   
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 OCS processes and required team members  Figure 16. 
 
This depiction of the OCS process synchronizing during the Military Decision Making 
Process. The Army publication Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures published this in 2011 for the primary audience of Army Brigade staffs or 
higher. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a, p. 2–1).  
This graphically depicts some of the horizontal integration required during a 
contracting operation. The JFC/Army Requirements Board can simply be exchanged with 
the relevant services oversight. The actual process is relevant regardless of the location of 
the contracting officer, as funding, source selection, and COR nomination process all 
occur within the process. The implied integration tasks include legal, resource 
management, finance, a contracting officer representative and service specific oversight. 
This publication must take into account the current operational realities and 
environment to inform operational units on OCS processes and capabilities. The 2014 
post-Afghanistan operational environment does not support simply entering a mature 
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theater of operations and conducting a transfer of authority with a unit. Future operations 
remain smaller, uncertain in destination and may require initial entry through theater 
closeout. This requires defined phased activities including timeliness, recommended 
contract management structures and contracting specific capability gap considerations. 
The ATTP discusses several planning considerations important to defining OCS in a new 
operational environment.  
This is a key consideration when considering if and what services to procure in an 
overseas environment. A command must make an informed decision as whether to 
augment a mission with support, as recent operations reflect more than providing 
logistical support in operations. 
Procurement lead time:   
An operational planner needs to understanding how long the lead time for the 
delivery of goods, especially when including non-organic procurement team into the 
operation. The Gansler commission cited late inclusion of contracting officers, at less 
than adequate numbers, as a main contributor to the levels of fraud, waste and abuse 
occurring in Iraq. The regulation offers a graphic, Figure 17, depicting a time phased 
version of procurement tasks and integration with the requiring activity and the special 
staff designated officer (3C) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a).  The 
activities of a 3C skilled staff can supplement the tactical or operational unit’s contracting 
capabilities in the early planning stages of an operation requiring contracted support.  
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 Notional Contract Support Timeline Figure 17. 
 
The notional contract support timeline graphic from the 2011 ATTP 4–10 Operational 
Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures provides a timeline depicting the 
separation of duties between a contracting officer representative and an OCS 3C staff 
officer (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a). 
Unauthorized commitment and ratification: 
The command must understand the risk and remedy of unauthorized commitments 
and authorizations. This is specifically important when establishing effective Contracting 
Officer Representative oversight and limitation of authority. Incurring an unauthorized 
commitment, as a result of uninformed actions, and the resulting ramifications can 
provide a level of visibility and reduced efficiency in a high-operational tempo 
environment. 
Importance of integration across staff: 
A common misconception of OCS is that the function resides within the logistics 
staff. OCS integration is left to the definition of the operational planner. Lessons learned 
underscore the importance of including all staff members into the planning process. 
Defining the tasks common to each staff section can assist in relaying the importance of 
horizontal integration. Additionally, the OCS planning process that includes the requiring 
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activity, the tactical unit and the commander’s strategic priorities describes the vertical 
integration required for effective OCS execution.  
Phase 0/shaping phase activities are key to OCS success: 
The mention of phase 0 in the ATTP acknowledges the importance of this phase.  
Effects of contracting on the battlefield: 
Joint Publication 4–10 states that OCS directly impacts the civil-military aspects 
of the battlefield. For an operational commander utilizing OCS, the goal might be to 
avoid harmful or adverse effects while filling tactical needs. Awareness that specific 
preferences embedded into the contracting process can create favorable effects on the 
battlefield. The Joint planning process relies on operational framing and the art of the 
field grade officer leading this effort, ideally a graduate of an intermediate/field grade 
level course. This document fills a gap in the absence of extensive formal accrediting 
non-acquisition focused OCS education. For services and agencies developing 
operational OCS specific guidance, this document can easily can be adjusted to 
operational level phase 0 planning considerations.  
Overall, this document provides detailed tactical guidance for the non-acquisition 
focused staff and requiring activities. The limitation of this document is in the apparent 
assumption that initial entry operations are not part of the tactical OCS mission set. Using 
this doctrine provides a structured approach for those organizations lacking doctrine. 
Moving from a structured to a more integrated maturing occurs once this document is 
accepted into an organization and becomes part of the OCS planning process. 
e. 2014 Army Training Publication 4–92 Contracting Support to Unified 
Land Operations 
Contracting in Unified Land Operations, written in 2014, for operational 
commander’s and staff, provides a description of how contracting fits into major Army 
and Joint forces (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014). Overall, this document 
provides the best overview and understanding of how the Army acquisition structures and 
process work. This can act as a primer for any service’s logistical officers or OCS 
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planners embedding into Army OCS lead operations. The primary contracting unit, the 
Contracting Support Brigade (CSB), often acts as the lead service in Joint operations and 
key tasks to support the combatant commander includes de-conflicting contracting 
actions between other services. This implies that each service might conduct their own 
contracting in an area of operations and requires a focal point to contact. The efficiency 
gained here is understanding the primary logistic and acquisition focal point of contact 
within ongoing operations, which can be chaotic during high-tempo operational phases. 
The need to exercise OCS in phase 0 operations provides the opportunities for all services 
to integrate their OCS capabilities/assets.   
Phase 0 planning and shaping activities relevant for all services can be extracted 
from the CSB tasks in this regulation. Phase 0 is defined as Joint Publication 5–0’s 
phasing model and is recognized as peacetime (not contingency operations) conditions 
where participation in on-site contracting support, exercises, and training events 
contribute to unit readiness and on preparation of acquisition personnel. There is an 
acknowledgement that OCS dependence may be increasing as the Army is reduced in 
size thus placing a greater emphasis on Phase 0/shaping operations. This regulation states 
that while the CSB plays a critical role in the OCS planning process, the primary 
responsibility resides with the component commands. The CSB doctrinally conducts 
specific phase 0 planning activities include, but not limited to the, following general tasks 
as updated from Army Technical Publication 4–92, Contract to Support Unified Land 
Operations in Figure 18 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–2). 
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 Phase 0 Tasks Figure 18. 
These are typical Phase 0 tasks as updated from Army Technical Publication 4–92, 
Contract to Support Unified Land Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2014, October 14). 
These tasks reside in phase 0. The above tasks were grouped into a few titles, and 
the supporting text is from the regulation. The Phase 0 education that ACC provides to 
stakeholders, in Figure 19, reflects the complexity of OCS beyond logistics, to include 
subjects like ethics, fiscal law, law of war, and Status of Foreign Forces. These phase 0 
activities reflect a high level of integration appropriate for a higher level of OCS and 
acquisition experience rather than being appropriate for newly warranted contracting 
officers. In practice, Army OCS exercises include both acquisition and non-acquisition 
personnel and best practices are further discussed in the following chapters. 
Establish a market base in operational area. 
“Gathering local business environment and market survey information, vendor lists, 
contract data, and contracting capability information; providing this information to the 
supported Joint forces command, theater or field Army OCS coordination cell (if 
formed) or other designated OCS staff as directed.” 
 
Analyze the operational environment. 
“Assisting the supported unit OCS coordination cell or designated OCS staff to 
analyze OCS analysis of the operational environment data.” 
 
Operational plan OCS assistance. 
“Providing advice and assistance in annex W development actions and OCS related 
matters in other operations plan (OPLAN) annexes.” 
 
Lessons learned gathering, sharing and archiving. 
“Collecting and preserving records, observations, insights, best practices, and after 
action reports for lessons learned, legal actions, or other uses, and providing to 
(agencies) as directed.” 
 
Requiring activity preparations and integrations with contracting staff. 
“Training unit ordering officers, assigning contracting officers and preparing them for 
deployment, as well as coordinating mission specific support arrangements.” 
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 Army Contract Command’s Doctrinal OCS Training Subjects Figure 19. 
 
Army Training Publication 4–92 Contracting in Unified Land Operations published in 
2014 presents a figure that describes training available from Army Contracting 
Command. The variety of training reflects the complexity that contracting brings to a 
battlefield (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–19). 
f. Army Regulation 715-9 Operational Contract Support Planning and 
Management 
This publication, released in 2011 a few years after the Gansler Commission and 
amid ongoing stability operations, intends to prescribe OCS planning roles and 
responsibilities in contingency environments. Originally released in 1999, this regulation 
still has the hallmarks of the original contingency contracting focus as specific guidance 
for contractors accompanying the force. The 2011 version includes and significantly 
expands the original contractor deployment coordinating instruction, contingency 
contracting coordinating tasks to high level Army staff, and non-acquisition guidance 
regarding the appropriateness of specific services (Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 2011b). For services looking to create and expand their own institutional 
knowledge, this regulation is intended to provide non-acquisition focused contingency 
contracting guidance applicable to the Army operational level (Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 2011b). This document provides insight on which staff members and 
agencies are charged as the focal point of specific OCS aspects. 
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1. Contractor management development. 
Focal point for training and managing specific aspects of OCS management, such 
as contractor management and tracking through SPOT and maintaining the appropriate 
mix of contracting versus organic support (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2011b). 
2. Education development.  
Appoints offices to manage the OCS aspect and embedding into Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b). 
3. Policy Development. 
 Identifies the office at the Army staff level offices responsible for OCS policy 
development, both acqu8isition and non-acquisition/logistics focused (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2011b). 
4. Integrate OCS planning across staff functions.  
The regulation identifies key areas of OCS integration by naming specific 
functions in key staff areas (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011). The 
offices/areas considered include, legal, resource management, mortuary affairs, medical 
command, G-1 contracting accountability reporting, G-2 vetting of contractor linguists, 
surgeon for pre-deployment contractor responsibilities, and criminal investigations to act 
as the ethical/fraud investigative arm of OCS. 
The list is linear and non-exhaustive, but the identified tasks can assist the 
operational single service planner a starting point to consider integrating tasks across a 
smaller elements. The limitation here is integration is not considered vertically with 
stakeholders, requiring activities and the tactical personnel executing and overseeing 
OCS within a specific operation. 
Key to phase 0, for acquisition and non-acquisition professionals, is the 
preparation of an Annex W, or Contract Support Plan (CSP). Army Regulation (AR) 715-
9 Operational Contract Support Planning and Management (2011) describes key steps 
and functions required in phase 0, applicable to all services aimed at a non-acquisition 
audience.  The primary responsibility for this names Army operational level planners to 
 80 
develop “orchestrated, synchronized, and detailed” contract support plans as supporting 
an operation orders (OPORDs) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b). 
Operational planners focusing on initial entry operations must consider the 
appropriateness and the cost versus capability gained of included contracted services 
support into an operation. This regulation provides a detailed and well-developed 
description and guidance appropriate for OCS planner regarding the inherently 
governmental functions, aimed at non-acquisition processionals. Beyond the basic 
definition, several restrictions and considerations are suggested when including 
contracted service support in a course of action. Some of these considerations include:  
Direction and control of combat and crisis situations, budgeting, and policy decisions 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b, p. 22). These considerations are 
important to operational level personnel considering when to contract out services. 
g. Summary Protocols 
There are multiple documents recording various aspects of OCS planning doctrine 
applicable to various levels. The inclusion of lessons learned protocols in the documents 
gives it an integrated rating. The elements of optimization do exist, notably external 
stakeholders are mentions, and tasks are defined for multiple staff sections. The lack of 
published metrics to measure the efficiency of planning tasks is lacking. Notably, a 
capability gap remains with initial entry operations lacking significant operational level 
planning factors. Common phase 0 themes were apparent through analyzing the themes 
in each document, tasks to commander’s, and identified phase 0 planning factors. For 
example, multiple documents describe the term inherently governmental function’ as a 
factor in considering services contracts. Additionally, procurement lead-time was 
mentioned in several documents although, only one provides a narrative and supporting 
graphic. These themes, necessary to initial entry operations and making procurement 
decisions were highlighted and expanded on in each section.  
The author recommends consolidating contingency contracting OCS planning 
factors relevant to single services. Some areas to consider: 
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Definitions of: inherently governmental function,  procurement lead time,  
unauthorized commitment and ratifications, effects of contracting  on the 
battlefield, and the importance of phase shaping phase activities  (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2011a, p. 2–1).   
Identifying key activities in the contingency contracting shaping phase at an 
operational level to include: Analyze the operational environment, develop 
operational contracting plan, requiring activity preparation and integration with 
contracting staff, lessons learned gathering, sharing and archiving. (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–2). 
Defining inherently governmental function considerations to include: Direction 
and control of combat and crisis situations, budgeting, and policy decisions 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b, p. 22). 
Contingency contracting executed at an operational level may be lesser in scope 
than that of a Joint Task Force. Still, understanding how to frame the operational 
environment without an OCSIC, and identify the focal points of contact to leverage a 
business base in a contingency environment are important tasks. 
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS/CONCLUSION  
This chapter conducted an analysis of current OCS and contingency contracting 
resources. This analysis was conducted with the Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity 
Model (HIPMM) model. This model was adapted to evaluate the maturity of OCS 
planning doctrine from two well-known acquisition and procurement models The Yoder 
Three Integrated Pillars of Success (TIPS) and the Contract Management Maturity Model 
(CMMM). I evaluated Joint and Army OCS planning doctrine, personnel structures, and 
protocols for maturity, at an operational level. Figures 20 and 21 reflect the findings of 
each section. The color-coding and designation, as explained in the methodology section, 
relates to the evidence found in published doctrine and GAO reports as evidence of the 
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Within a Joint Forces, and Joint Task Force construction, the platforms pillar is 
rated as optimized reflecting organizational planning incorporating OCS planning factors 
in system working across staff functions and phases of the operation. The use of formal 
planning structures in a joint task force environment includes APEX in planning and 
JJLIS in lessons learned. The Army Forces level also utilized a lessons learned platform, 
 84 
while allowing for operational level planning resources to incorporate OCS planning 
factors. Therefore, the Army Forces command receives an optimized rating in the 
HIPMM. 
2. Protocols 
The protocol pillar was found as integrated for both Joint and Army doctrine, as 
the planning doctrine reflects an acknowledgement of both acquisition and non-
acquisition tasks are articulated across staff members. Although, performance metrics 
were not published, although may be held within specific combatant commands. JP 4-10 
specifically mentions the assignment of mission specific metrics to the OSCIC, so 
possible this is optimized at each individual combatant command. The primary 
weaknesses of the reviewed protocols include too much literature with varying levels of 
focus ranging from strategic to tactical level. Additionally, a capability gap was identified 
at the operational level planning guidance applicable to initial entry, midsized single 
service missions.  
3. Personnel 
Both the Joint and Army operational command’s acquisition personnel were 
found as optimized as contracting units are assigned habitually to supported units. The 
Army Contracting Command’s Brigade supports combatant commands along with the 
Contingency Contracting Battalion (CCBn) supporting major Army Command’s during 
all phases of operations, to include readiness exercises. Joint force non-acquisition 
personnel structures were rated as optimized as multiple structures multi-disciplinary 
OSC Integration Cell, and permanent assignment/availability of the Joint Contracting 
Acquisition Support Office. The Army specific non-acquisition personnel structure was 
rated as optimized with the creation of the 3C skill identifier embedded into operational 
staff structures.  
The above analysis of OCS resources as ranging from integrated to optimized in 
maturity, and appropriate for the services. The military services looking to adapt Army 
and Joint doctrine into their own can use this to guide the level of maturity needed to 
support their decided role within OCS operations. Deciding what level guidance is 
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needed based on that role, ranging from participating in Joint exercises to allowing 
operational units the capability to support/augment a contingency with OCS. With that 
guidance, extracting tasks relevant for smaller scale (not lead service operations). 
Additionally, each service’s new doctrine needs takes into account the need to 
incorporate initial entry operations, not just RIP/TOA factors. Overall, the guidance 
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IV. CURRENT PRACTICE OF OCS IN THE SHAPING PHASE 
Institutionalizing Operational Contract Support, as a key defense capability, 
requires all services to define the planning actions to develop and maintain this function. 
Developing this function with other services’ current doctrine and personnel structures 
requires a focus on their training and exercises. This chapter investigates the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures in Army and Joint readiness exercises executed during the 
shaping phase. To do this, first, I will describe the current OCS operational environment 
and recent challenges in institutionalizing OCS across the forces. Next, I will describe the 
practice of the Army’s inclusion of OCS in tactical-level exercises. Then, I will describe 
OCS exercises executed at the combatant command level. Finally, I will evaluate each 
exercise for tiered integration as described in Yoder’s Three Tier Model (c).  
A. OCS AND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
The practice of OCS in the DOD are affected by both the current operational 
environment and the problems OCS faces institutionalizing across the forces. Current 
doctrine focuses on units transitioning into an established and mature theater of 
operation. Today’s operational units no longer transition solely with units already 
established in a theater of operation; now, they can expect to conduct initial-entry 
operations into either a mature or immature theater of operation. The basic framework 
surrounding the operational contract support was discussed in Chapter III although it does 
not address theater maturity. This chapter identifies OCS readiness best practices and 
planning factors for these levels of maturity outside Joint and Army doctrine already 
covered.  
1. Current Operational Contract Support Environment 
Planning OCS into expeditionary operations includes factors such as, type of 
mission, the degree of the economy’s maturity, and successful integration with 
interagency participants. The 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) describes the  
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strategic environment as one of rapid change and complexity which “requires … a Joint 
Force capable of swift and decisive force projection around the world” (CJCS, 2015, p. 
10). Developing speed in force projection from an OCS and contingency contracting 
perspective requires focused shaping phase planning factors and integration among staff 
reinforced in readiness exercises.  
The newly aligned operational phases in JP 4-10 Operational Contract Support 
and the addition of the shaping phase requires further definition. The Joint Force 
Prioritized Mission list in the 2015 NMS identifies two priorities relevant to developing 
timely OCS planning factors. First, the mission list identifies that the forces must be 
capable of conducting stability operations, albeit on a limited basis, and with broad 
interagency participation. Higher on NMS joint forces priority list is conducting limited 
contingency operations, which involves crises action planning in new theaters that at 
varying degrees of maturity. Given both priorities, OCS planning factors need to account 
for both initial entry operations and for conducting stability operations.  
Planning for initial entry operations requires more guidance than using the tactics, 
techniques and procedures developed for stability operations in a mature environment. 
Both mission priorities reference external stakeholders or partners, developing the 
expectation of interagency participation. An integrated planner, as found in the Yoder 
Three-Tier Model (YTTM) can assist integrating and planning for both these conditions 
facilitating the recognition of external stakeholders and the ability to integrate across 
them. 
2. Yoder Three-Tier Model 
The Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM) was first published in 2004 to address the 
challenges of contracting in military operations (Yoder, 2004). The YTTM captures the 
hierarchy of credentials needed to optimize the OCS planning process, which is 
especially relevant in today’s integrated operational environment. Two primary 




stakeholder integration and second, this is best addressed through the use of credentialed 
planners. The central theme in the YTTM is the use of a high level integrator planning 
expert (IPE) among staff, external stakeholders and the combatant commander as 
depicted in Figure 22. 
 YTTM Integraed Planner and Executer Model Figure 22. 
 
This figure depicts the intended use of an IPE on a combatant command’s staff, 
integrating among external stakeholders, across Joint Task Force staff, and assisting in 
the operational framing of a mission (Yoder, 2010a, p. 94).  
The model proposes three tiers of personnel needed to optimize the contingency 
contracting planning process (Yoder, 2004). The three levels include an Ordering Officer 
(OO), a Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO), and finally an Integrated Planner and 
Executor (IPE). The original framework’s first two levels, as depicted in Figure 23, focus 
on the acquisition contracting structure. The OO executes the lowest level of contingency 
contracting duties and is generally uninvolved in the planning process. The focus on this 
level is procuring to fulfill the identified requirements through established contracting 
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vehicles and structures. The LCO represents the next higher level of operational planning 
and knowledge with more responsibility and authority than the ordering officer. Here, the 
expectation is the LCO “leverages” the buying power of the requiring activity onto a 
local economy (Yoder 2011).  
The IPE is the highest level credentialed personnel linking strategic objectives to 
an operational plan while facilitating the staff integration process during planning 
process.  The IPE has both experience and credentials as a planner and is embedded into 
the combatant commander’s staff. The experience comes from previous contracting tours, 
and the credentialing are through attending Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
phases I and II, and completion of War College. The OO, LCO and the IPE combined 
provide a multidimensional approach in OCS from the planning phases through execution 
at the tactical level designed to fully optimize the function in an operation. 
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 Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Operations Figure 23. 
 
The Yoder Three Tier Model for Contingency Contracting represents a 
tiered approach to planning and oversight. The model proposes the use of 
an Intenerated Planner and Executer (IPE) to oversee the integration of 
planning among staff, external stakeholders, and with the supported units 
(Yoder, 2004).    
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This Yoder Three Tier Model, and the Hybrid Integrated Process Maturity Model 
(HIPMM) will both be used to analyze OCS levels of integration across staff and 
stakeholders, in varying levels of theater maturity, and integrating and training OCS in 
two current readiness exercises.  
3. OCS and Theater Maturity 
Outside of stability operations and the focus on transferring contract management 
authority with an established unit, crises action planning requires units to integrate and 
plan for less known environments.  JP 4-10 indicates that OCS directly effects the civil-
military aspects of the operational environment (CJCS, 2014). The use of the OCSIC in 
Joint Task Forces provides the expertise and focus to fully consider the operational 
environment and the maturity of the business base and theater.  
Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to identifying 
the conditions required to achieve stated objectives; avoiding the effects 
that may hinder mission accomplishment (undesired effects); and 
assessing the impact of friendly, adversarial, and other actors, such as the 
local populace, on the commander’s concept of operations and progress 
toward achieving the JFC’s objectives. (CJCS, 2014, p. G-1) 
The OSCIC considers, doctrinally, initial entry considerations can consider civil-
military factors such as determining how OCS spending impacts a local economy or 
understanding how effective contract award and management can increase goodwill with 
local businessmen toward United States Forces (CJCS, 2014). Additionally, factors such 
as road infrastructure maturity must also be considered, as undeveloped lines of 
communication can affect contractor performance, as discussed later in the chapter. For 
OCS, this means contracting concerns need to be integrated early into the planning 
process supporting effective, and cost-conscious, contracting solutions in foreign 
environments. By integrating early, the commander and all staff can understand how best 
to leverage the OCS capability while facilitating partnerships with other agencies, the 
host nation and coalition forces as described in the 2015 NMS. During crises action 
planning, each staff member, and external stakeholder is affected by the level of theater 
maturity when working to integrate OCS into their operational plan. 
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 Recent operations and readiness exercises now incorporate contingency 
contracting supporting crises situations in countries at all levels of theater and economic 
maturity. The Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook released in July 2015 advises 
the contracting officer to consider the maturity of the theater of operations in planning for 
contingency contracting. Figure 24 is the DCCH’s description of theater maturity and 
was updated with additional theater maturity considerations. E. Cory Yoder, a published 
researcher and advocate of contingency contracting’s phase 0, discussed theater maturity 
in 2004 to include both the nature of the local economy’s development as important to 
planning. He also describes disaster relief operations and the inherent nature of disorder 
in humanitarian relief operations as contributing to theater maturity (or immaturity).  
 OCS Theater Maturity Figure 24. 
OCS definition of immature versus mature theater as updated from the Defense 
Procurement Acquisition Policy published Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook 
(DPAP, 2015). The graphic was updated from Naval Postgraduate School’s class 
MN3318 Defense Contingency Contracting session 4 titled Planning and Guidance 
(Yoder, 2015c). 
Mature [Theater] 
 Non-Acquisition: A sophisticated transportation and distribution system that can rapidly 
respond to changing requirements and priorities. 
 
Acquisition: Established government compliant market base with sufficient vendors, with 
government contracting experience, that can comply with Federal Acquisition Regulation 
requirements to meet contingency contracting demands; an infrastructure capable of housing e-
business tools; and, in the best case, an inplace DoD contracting office or structure.  
 
Examples: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Korea, and Western Europe 
 
Contingency Contracting elements of a foreign marketplace. 
Business capacity and capability 
Host-nation support agreements (legal framework) 




Non-Acquisition: An ... area with little or no built-up infrastructure and few vendors. The available 
vendors are likely to have limited to no experience contracting with the U.S. government. 
 Acquisition: A marketplace characterized as deficient any of the above element of a 
marketplace. 
 Example: An example of an immature contracting environment is the Horn of Africa…and the 
initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  
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Theater maturity effects not only the contingency contracting officer (CCO) 
executing needed requirements, but also the operational planners preparing the tactical 
plan and appropriately resourcing the CCO to achieve a cost-conscious environment. 
These factors are outside to the reviewed doctrine in Chapter III, and require 
consideration during the OCS planning process. 
4. Problems in Institutionalizing Operational Contract Support    
OCS has still not institutionalized across all combatant commands, as of March 
2015 (GAO, 2013). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that 4 out of 6 
combatant commands incorporate OCS into Joint training plans, and into readiness 
related exercises (GAO, 2013, p. 1). As agencies move toward fulfilling the identified 
OCS capability gaps, more recent  reports regarding the deficiencies in current OCS and 
contingency contracting operations can provide information to detect weaknesses in 
either current doctrine or practice and provide an informed position in creating service 
specific doctrine solutions.  
a. Problems Institutionalizing OCS across the Department of Defense 
The 2013 GAO report DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate 
Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning states that comprehensive, 
service specific OCS guidance and contingency contract planning guidance hasn’t been 
issued by all services because only the Army has been the Lead Service for the effort. 
(GAO, 2013) The efforts to date surround familiarizing the service personnel with the 
process versus providing a comprehensive contingency contracting planning solution. 
(GAO, 2013). Further, the GAO asserts, that the services, outside of the acting as lead 
service in a joint operation, still spent over $1 billion dollars in Afghanistan in fiscal year 
11. The argument here, is that each service needs to create comprehensive OCS and 
contingency contracting procedures, instead of relying on basic awareness of OCS 
procedures. Developing these procedures with defined Army doctrine and structures can 
be further sharpened by understanding the current issues encountered in training end 
executing OCS operations in recent contingency environments. 
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b. Institutionalizing OCS through Mobile Training Teams 
Mobile training teams have been used to facilitate OCS knowledge while the 
forces work towards institutionalizing the OCS capability across their respective services. 
An Army divisional staff was appointed a JTF and charged to form an Operational 
Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC) requested OCS pre-deployment training. 
Several agencies and stakeholders mobilized to provide the needed support. Training 
included the three OCS joint framework functions, to include contract support, contract 
integration and contractor management while also addressing requiring activity roles and 
responsibilities. Many of the staff participated in the training, to include all staff sections 
(J1, J2, J3, J4, Surgeon and the OCSIC) who discussed the implications of the OCS 
function in their specific areas of operation. The end result prepared a staff to deploy in 
support of a crises or contingency through the use of a mobile training team (citation) as 
doctrinally, an Army division is most likely to be assigned to perform as part of a JTF 
which includes OCS duties. On de-classification of this operation, future researchers can 
provide a detailed analysis and review regarding the effectiveness of the training and how 
executing OCS either positively or negatively impacted the operational environment. The 
key to effective OCS execution seems to remain in successful integration across staff in 
the planning process. 
c. Institutionalizing OCS throughout Staff Functions 
Identifying the implications and importance of OCS through staff sections is key 
to successful integration in the planning process. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
OCS is more than providing for a warfighters needs. The joint training teams and the 
army has provided training and definitions of tasks across staff sections. The  Operational 
Contract Support Wheel of Integration video supporting OCS Joint exercise 2015 
describes the importance of integrating across all staff and external stakeholders to 
optimize the function as described in Figure 25. 
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 OCS Vertical and Horizontal Staff Integration Example Figure 25. 
 
This is the representation of the 2014 Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise 







(OCS is) Commanders Business across all staff sections where optimizing {this function] effects 
through all phases of operations to further both kinetic & non-kinetic impacts. 
 
Staff: 
J-2 Intelligence: Targeting effects management capability. 
 
J-6 Communication: Synchronization and identifying contracted solution needs early and planning for 
mission integration. 
 
J-8 Resource Management: Transparent use of taxpayer dollars and providing accountability and 
promoting efficient use of government funds. 
 
Judge Advocate General: Legal Counsel across the area of operations ensuring compliance with 
statues while flexibly using Money as a Weapon System. 
 
Surgeon: Contractor support through medical care and ensuring contractor workforce is considered in 
medical planning and execution. 
 
Public affairs: Promoting positive OCS effects and proactively getting story out on negative OCS 
effects to the public and synchronizing communication. 
 
Stakeholders: 
Department of Defense: Geopolitical impacts and garnering positive, targeted economic impacts. 
 
Financial Management: Money as a Weapon System and capitalizing on the economic power dollars 
bring...on the battlefield or in a catastrophe. 
 
Department of State: Geopolitical impacts, ensuring economic effects are developed in coordination 
with the department of state and other key players. 
 
Department of State: Economic Impact and promoting positive OCS effects 
through all phases of operations to further both kinetic & non-kinetic impacts.  
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 Joint Staff OCS Activities  Figure 26. 
 
This graphic from Defense Acquisition University’s class titled Introduction to 
Operational Contract Support Planning and Annex W Preparation dated 2012 presented 
at Naval Postgraduate School (Yoder, 2015b). 
The importance of horizontal staff integration by position is defined by staff 
member in Figure 26. Not only does OCS planning guidance include horizontal 
integration, but also recognizes the need to integrate horizontally with external 
stakeholders. Figure 25 developed from Army Contracting Command’s annual training 
exercise promotional video describe several external stakeholders and their value in the 
OCS mission. These various levels of integration are reinforced with the use of the 
YTTM IPE whose knowledge and experience in the field provides the connections and 
knowledge to integrate the stakeholders, staff and commander’s strategic objectives into 
an operational OCS plan. 
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B. EXAMPLE OF OCS IN A TRAINING EXERCISES  
Institutionalizing OCS across the forces and contributing to operational readiness 
means including this function into training exercises, identified as top priority on the 
Initial Capabilities Document in 2011 (DASDPS, 2013). As of 2015, the Government 
Accountability Office recognized four of six combatant commands as identifying OCS as 
a core capability and included this function in their annual readiness exercises (GAO, 
2015). As a significant example, U.S. Southern Forces command (SOUTHCOM) 
embedded Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) IPE planners into 
their staff for over seven years who facilitate the integration of OCS into their annual 
training exercise.  
1. U.S. Southern Command’s integration OCS Exercise 
U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM)’s OCS staff integrated this function 
through the subordinate services in two major readiness exercises. In 2014, SOUTHCOM 
sponsored the training exercise, commonly referred to as PANAMEX, as a multinational 
training exercise within their Area of Operations (AOR). The intent of the simulated 
training exercises is to develop plans supporting increased readiness and response  
to requests for assistance in areas of their operations. The 2014 PANAMEX joint task 
force exercise included international participation of 17 nations (U.S. Southern 
Command, 2014).  
OCS integration and planning is represented through the well-established 
embedded Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) cell (U.S. Southern 
Command, 2014. The staff in the SOUTHCOM staff representing the JCASO office has 
years of OCS experience who act as the primary overseer of integrating OCS into bi-
annual exercises such as the 2014 and 2015 PANAMEX. As stated in JP 4-10, 
contingency contracting and material needs are a service specific function. In a personal 
communication with the JCASO OCS planners, in PANAMEX they facilitated the 
division of their combatant command’s appointing each service as the lead contracting 
duties for that area and/or country. The expectation was that each service identify the 
capability gaps of their projected mission for that area, conduct market research for 
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fulfilling this gap, develop the requiring activity documents, and finally engage 
contracting officer’s to develop the market base creating viable contract vehicles for 
future use.  
Service specific OCS shaping phase tasks were reinforced through this exercise. 
In this particular exercise the tasks include: capability gap analysis, evaluating the 
business environment, developing a vendor base, forming a contract vehicle 
development, while consolidating requirements with other services according to the 
SOUTHCOM JCASO office (personal communication, May 14, 2015). This approach 
supports OCS the Joint Task Force staff members to conduct OCS integration through 
their subordinate staff. This also forces the services to identify the viable contracting staff 
structures within the task force and develop the associated lines of communication. 
Finally, the contingency contracting staff and assets are either identified or developed by 
the services. While service specific tasks are highlighted, the JCASO office itself acts as 
the integrator. 
a. YTTM Model Analysis 
The PANAMEX exercise exhibited a high level of integration using the IPE level 
to coordinate and oversee OCS tasks, instead of relying on ordering officers to facilitate 
this function. The JCASO-embedded staff represents a highly credentialed OCS planning 
workforce helped integrate the lower-level ordering officers and logisticians. 
Additionally, the JCASO office, as a subordinate agency to the Defense Logistics 
Agency, has developed relationships within not only their own joint command, but many 
needed interagency assets throughout the DOD. JCASO linked and integrated the OCS 
plan across the joint staff and the external stakeholder agencies such as DLA, throughout 
the shaping phase. They provided the needed integration to the services with to initial 
entry assets including the Army Contracting Command’s Contracting Service Brigades 
who provided contracting structures and authorities to this exercise. Overall, the 
execution of developing the OCS function across the services meets the IPE level of 
credentialing as described in the YTTM. Overall, this created an environment to 
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successfully leverage OCS effects across a battle space, versus simply mitigating the risk 
and incidents of fraud, waste, and abuse.  
b. HIPMM Analysis 
The non-acquisition and acquisition personnel structures utilized in this exercise 
are representative of an optimized level, as depicted below in Figure 27. The Army’s 
Contracting Support Brigade is permanently assigned to the joint command and provides 
ongoing support. The non-acquisition staff, JCASO, facilitates the integration of tasks 
among logistics and the acquisition staff and is also permanently assigned and integrated 
across staff and external stakeholders representing an optimized rating. The ongoing 
relationship of JCASO to this combatant command is defined as permanent, although not 
necessarily reflective of an actual change to the force structure’s authorization 
documents. The protocols were evaluated as optimized as actual contracting solutions 
assist in defining the metrics are held locally and the lessons learned platforms are 
utilized in both an informal (After Action Reports) and formal arenas. The platforms 
available to joint exercises includes planning structures and lessons learned platforms 
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2. Army OCS Tactical-Level Training   
This section will describe the Army’s practice of contingency contracting in 
tactical level readiness exercises. The planning resources are different when executing 
OCS at a with a Joint Task Force and at a single service tactical level. First, the JCASO 
office and the OSCIC, primary elements integrating the function across staff and 
conducting operational framing for JTF are not available. The tactical level operates with 
less OCS resources as compared to a JTF and relies more on executing contingency 
contracting to fulfill warfighter needs, versus effects based contracting. The following 
discussion will describe a new shaping phase contingency contracting planning model 
specific to tactical exercises developed recently for Army exercises at Fort Irwin, CA. 
First, the use of a credentialed and high level integrator oversees and evaluates the 
acquisition and non-acquisition personnel in the execution of contingency contracting. 
Second, an acquisition specific training and evaluation model, called the 270 Road to 
War, providing Army tactical level acquisition units with the training and support needed 
to support Brigade sized elements in contingency operations. 
The Army has integrated and executed contingency contracting within tactical 
level units at Fort Irwin’s National Training Center (NTC). Brigade sized operational 
units (referred to as the rotational unit) are assigned to conduct 30–60 day readiness 
exercises at the NTC are assigned an offsite non-organic contingency contracting team 
who provides real-world contracting solutions. In a personal communication with the 
overseeing contracting activity permanently assigned to the NTC, inclusion of 
contingency contracting to support these units began in the mid-1990s for Army 
rotational units to the NTC. Senior contracting personnel in the Mission Instillation 
Contracting Command (MICC), Fort Irwin, provide oversight to the contingency 
contracting teams assigned to support rotational units at the NTC. The overseeing 
MICC’s stated mission is now changing and reflects the institutionalization of the 
contingency contracting function within Army forces. Below is the current mission 
statement, followed by the proposed mission statement, as determined from a personal 
interview with NTC Contracting Command personnel in June 2015. Current CCO 
Program Mission Statement 
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The mission of the NTC Rotational Contracting Officer Program is to 
provide contracting support to the Rotational Training Unit (RTU) while 
enhancing CCOs understanding and capability to manage situations that 
may be encountered while providing expeditionary contracting support.   
Proposed CT Program Mission Statement 
The mission of the NTC Rotational Contracting Team Program is to 
coach, teach and mentor Contracting Team leaders, Non-Commissioned 
Officer In Charge (NCOIC)s and team members on the applications and 
execution of Operational Contract Support to improve the capabilities of 
the Contracting Team and train to be a combat multiplier and battlefield 
enhancer.   Provide a critical and direct support component to validate 
team capabilities in the 270 day Road to War framework.  
There are two significant changes in the proposed mission statement. First, it now 
includes the 270 Day Road to War framework, which is discussed in more detail below. 
The second change is a shift from training the contingency contracting officer 
individually to training the Contingency Contracting Team (CCT) as a cohesive and 
deployable unit capable of supporting a brigade sized element in a contingency 
environment.  
As covered in Chapter III, the CCT provides contracting support to Army tactical 
level units, specifically brigades (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014). The 
CCT is assigned to a brigade when the brigade is assigned a rotation to the NTC. The 
mission at NTC is to validate the training of army tactical level heavy brigades in a 
typical 45–60 day rotation in Fort Irwin, CA. The CCT members interact with their 
assigned brigade staff to provide real-time material solutions to the brigade’s capability 
gaps. The contracting officers assigned to support brigades during NTC rotations are 
typically the lowest level ordering officer in the YTTM. The MICC-Fort Irwin engages 
the rotational unit and the contracting team early in the process to extend the time and 
planning horizon evaluation process, keeping this from being an ad-hoc function. 
The operational units deploy much of their equipment from home station to NTC, 
much like initial entry operations into a new operating area. The contracting officers 
provide a link to the local economy providing many of the material solutions needed to 
house and transport a brigade-sized element. Examples of needed support include 
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material handling equipment such as fork lifts or refrigerated trucks for food or ice 
delivery. Many of the planning tools used include the Annex W, although there is a 
greater reliance on using a contract requirements matrix focusing on the more detailed 
and time phased by-commodity sync, needed for the tactical level. The acquisition and 
non-acquisition staff integration in planning, execution and contractor management 
oversight is conducted by a senior level integrator, as described in the YTTM. A long-
range focus for the MICC-Fort Irwin is to provide the anticipated non-acquisition brigade 
staff 3C OCS planners with the same oversight during the planning phases working 
providing focused evaluation on the integration of non-organic acquisition support into 
the supported unit’s staff tasks and functions.  
In an interview with the MICC personnel, both the contracting officers and the 
rotational units are evaluated and provided senior-level observations through prepared 
action reports capturing the lessons learned. A repeated concern during after action 
assessments is a lack of cohesion between the brigade staff and the CCT during the 
planning process prior to arriving at NTC, as relayed in a personal communication from 
NTC personnel oversight. In general, a lack of cohesion can create issues during planning 
phases and execution of contractor oversight. Leaders at the MICC-Fort Irwin created a 
shaping phase model initiative designed to assist in providing more integration feedback 
to the evaluated units via integrating an experienced contracting professional as oversight 
to the CCT and the Rotational beyond the 30–60 day execution timeframe at NTC.  
The newly proposed model Capstone 270 Day Road to War model provides Army 
tactical units the ability to train for mission readiness supporting a brigade without 
actually attending an NTC rotation. MICC-Fort Irwin provides senior level OCS qualified 
evaluators the acquisition units requesting readiness exercises who present a choice of 
mission scenarios to include crises action planning or supporting stability operations. 
These evaluators will provide feedback and mentorship 270 days resulting in the 
validation of the unit’s 5 team member readiness to deploy and support a brigade sized 
element in contingency operations. The model’s tasks are developed from doctrine, best 
practices and the current practices of NTC assigned CCY units providing support to the 
on the ground rotational units.  
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a. YTTM Analysis  
The original intent of the YTTM is to provide a tier approach to integration in a 
joint environment. Using the YTTM to evaluate the NTC 270 Road to War model 
articulates an integrated approach to training oversight through the use of an IPE, 
although at a tactical level instead of the joint level. Matching both the acquisition and 
non-acquisition staff (future mission), at the tactical level, with mid- to senior-grade 
staffed positions provides the coaching needed to fully integrate OCS across all staff. The 
IPE level oversight of the CCT’s ordering officers, provides focused acquisition oversight 
and additional coaching and mentorship on acquisition specific tasks, but also provides 
oversight of the CCT integrating successfully across the supported units. Tactical level 
OCS planning procedures will emerge as this model matures in use. 
b. HIPMM Analysis 
The initiatives put in place by MICC-Fort Irwin to supplement operational level 
OCS guidance increased the maturity of the OCS planning resources, as depicted in 
Figure 28. Significantly, the acquisition personnel pillar rated optimized with the use of a 
permanent integrator to coach and evaluated the inorganic contracting team supporting 
the rotational unit. The acquisition personnel are assigned to a supported unit for the 
purposes of a specific NTC training exercise and not permanently assigned to support a 
unit through all phases, and, therefore, is rated as structured.  The non-acquisition OCS 
3C officers are organic to the typical units training at NTC. At the time of this research, 
the rotational unit’s manned with 3C OCS officers was not observed as a regular 
occurrence resulting in a structure, versus an integrated, rating. Contingency contracting 
specific tasks are identified for both the logistician in the rotational unit, resulting in a 
structured evaluation. Protocols are rated as structured, as Army doctrine defines OCS for 
higher commands than a brigade staff. Finally, the contingency contracting platforms are 
rated as optimized as MICC-Fort Irwin provides detailed After Action Reports and 
Lessons Learned feedback to the team and to their supporting commands, resulting in an 
optimized rating.  
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The maturity levels of the acquisition pillar and the platforms pillar was increased 
due to locally imposed initiatives. As previously discussed, Army doctrine is optimized 
for the joint task force level, although OCS planning activities for an operational level are 
still undefined. The OCS function here at NTC could appear ad-hoc as the tactical units 
contracting support is identified and paired on assignment of a rotation to NTC. Although 
the 270-day road to war initiative enabled by an IPE provides resources to keep this from 
emerging as an ad-hoc function by extending the planning phase to allow for inclusion of 
inorganic contracting support. Overall, the permanently assigned MICC-Fort Irwin 
contingency contracting qualified oversight to NTC assigned personnel, and the initiative 
270 Day road to war, provided a boost in the ratings maturity by extending the planning 
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C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
This chapter reviewed and analyzed two OCS operations, one a joint level 
operations and one a tactical level with the YTTM. Both operations were evaluated as 
effectively using an IPE during OCS shaping phase operational exercises. At the tactical 
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level, the NTC 270 Road to War model notionally applies the IPE oversight in mentoring, 
training and coaching to both an acquisition structure and a tactical level non-acquisition 
brigade staff. The use of the JCASO IPE during a training exercise supports the teaching, 
coaching and mentoring in single service staff officers participating and interacting 
within a joint task force. Both models address theater maturity and immaturity. NTC 
MICC-Fort Irwin staff provides the higher headquarters the option for continuing to 
reinforce stability operations, or imposing initial entry operations into an immature 
theater. The JCASO planner inherently provides training in initial entry operations into 
varying degrees of maturity through assigning all countries under their area of operations 
and requiring an evaluation and viability of a marketplace. Both training environments 
support a high level of integration of OCS into associated missions.   
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the current state of OCS in the current environment. Then, 
problems institutionalizing OCS across the services were discussed. Next, the YTTM 
model was described as a method to evaluate effective training across the forces. Then, 
the OCS best practices incorporated into two training exercises were discussed. Joint 
Task Force best practices at SOUTHCOM as integrated with the JCASO office was 
described and analyzed as effectively integrated. Training at NTC and the new initiative 
270 Road to War model designed to facilitate integration of OCS during training 
exercises in both inorganic acquisition assigned staff, and tactical level brigade staff. 
Collectively, both levels of OCS inclusion into readiness exercises provides guidance and 





V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This MBA project investigated the following research questions: 
Primary Question: What components of current OCS planning doctrine can 
be adapted into single/lead service planning doctrine? 
 Subsidiary Question 1: What is the relevant history leading to current OCS 
doctrine and practice? 
Subsidiary question 2: What are key elements of Joint and Army doctrine 
relevant to single service contingency contracting constructs? 
Subsidiary question 3: What is the current state of practice in OCS and how 
is it related to single services? 
Subsidiary question 4: What specific findings and recommendations can be 
made? 
 In answering the primary question, first the literature review examined the relevant 
history and leading to current OCS doctrine and practice.  
Subsidiary Question 1: What is the relevant history leading to current OCS 
doctrine and practice? 
Current OCS planning doctrine, procedures, and personal structures were 
developed in recent decades even though United States (U.S.) military forces have 
significantly contracted with commercial sources during wartime since the revolutionary 
war. Five distinct timeframes were found to characterize the relevant history leading to 
modern day Operational Contract Support (OCS) and doctrine; wartime contracting, 
contingency contracting, contingency contracting reform, OCS and institutionalizing 
OCS.   
Wartime contracting was the longest timespan with commercial contractors 
supporting operations in most major conflicts from 1775 to the beginning of the 20th 
century. Each conflict’s contracting environment and operations were afflicted with 
supply shortages, issues surrounding cost and waste.  Even with repeated use, wartime 
contracting as a function was mostly ad-hoc and the legislation and regulations developed 
during this time was reactive. 
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The emergence of contingency contracting marked the first recognition that 
contracting during wartime was unique requiring resources outside of peacetime 
contracting.  During this time, the term “contingency contracting” was officially 
recognized and defined in DOD literature. Most doctrine developed at the time, termed 
“contractors on the battlefield,” contained procedural guidance for incorporating 
contractors into the total force mix. Acquisition and contracting law recognized the need 
for streamlined procedures during contingency operations, raising small purchase 
thresholds for unusual or compelling circumstances. Both Joint and Army doctrine 
emerged still focusing on procedures to incorporate contractors as part of the total mix. 
No significant contingency contracting planning doctrine was incepted at this time as a 
separate or specialized function. Key contingency contracting structures and doctrine 
emerged after two key commissions found deficiencies in this area. 
Contingency contracting reform occurred in the 21st century as a result while the 
DOD was engaged during major stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army 
launched the Gansler Commission whose findings included a need to increase the stature 
and resources available in the Army contracting/acquisition profession to keep pace with 
the amount of requirements requested in Iraq and Afghanistan. The congressionally 
sponsored Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan created 
an ongoing investigative body who uncovered that an estimated $5 billion were lost due 
to fraud, waste and abuse surrounding issues such as poor contractor management. These 
two key reports provided the political will and resources needed to create the more 
centralized acquisition structure represented with Army Contracting Command. This new 
structure and resource provided an increase in contracting doctrine and resources acting 
as the foundation of today’s available doctrine.  
Operational Contract Support emerged during stability operations, in 2008, 
providing a joint focused planning construct. The three associated functions; contract 
management, contract integration and contracting support, provide the foundation of the 
modern day approach to contingency contracting in joint operations. This new construct 
and the associated Army Contracting Command provide key resources in conducting 
contingency contracting in overseas environments for major operations. During this 
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timeframe doctrine became more focused on planning and integration of the function into 
stability operations, versus the ad-hoc and reactive legislation and doctrine developed in 
past decades. Money as a Weapon System, a primarily financial management focused 
guide for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, created the notion that contracting and 
spending could influence the operational environment providing those commander tools 
needed to create targeted effects through reconstruction and goodwill efforts. Debate 
continues today as to whether these programs were effective and created the intended 
civil-military focused effect originally intended.  
The current strategic focus of OCS is institutionalizing the function throughout 
the DOD and each service. This function was declared as a core defense capability with 
the OCS Joint Concept validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.. The 
supporting OSC action plan consists of over 170 different actions designed to fill the 
capabilities gap through 2019. Throughout these documents, the term cost-consciousness 
is introduced, as used in a report of the same title submitted to congress in 2012.  The 
report recommends addressing this concept through leader awareness and the creation of 
contingency contracting focused metrics. The remainder of the project focuses on the 
development of OCS planning phase resources as this is key to developing cost-
consciousness in contingency operations. 
Subsidiary question 2: What are key elements of Joint and Army doctrine 
relevant to single service contingency contracting constructs? 
The key elements of Joint and Army doctrine relevant to single services were 
found by analyzing doctrine through a hybrid of two well-known acquisition specific 
models. The Hybrid Integrative Planning of Maturity Model (HIPMM) was created 
through the Yoder Three Pillars to Integrative Success© (TIPS) and the Dr. René 
Rendon’s Contract Management Maturity Model© (CMMM). Before describing the 
model, the Joint OCS framework was defined and described.  
Contract Support was in the alignment of the notional OCS phased model with 
the standard operational phases found in JP 3-0 Joint Operations through the addition of 
the shaping phase. The shaping phase, in OCS doctrine, is described in Joint Publication 
4-10 as “designed to dissuade or deter adversaries, develop relationships with, and assure 
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multinational partners, as well as to set conditions for the successful execution of 
contingency plans and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities. 
Significant OCS-related phase 0 actions include establishment of contract-related boards, 
cells, and working groups,” (CJCS, 2014, p. I-11). The shaping phase, phase 0 can 
significantly impact the operational battlefield, later stages of the operation, and the final 
budget outcome. In fact, JP 4–10 states that a lack of emphasis on this function in phase 0 
is a major hindrance in the planning process. This newly added phase requires further 
definition and understanding of what tasks need to be executed to best leverage OCS 
capabilities. Phase 0 encompasses more than simply requirements generation activities. In 
their 2013 article Phase Zero Contracting Operations—Strategic and Integrative 
Planning for Contingency and Expeditionary Operations E. Cory Yoder and Dayne E. 
Nix identify Phase 0 as a cyclical process. Here, the intent of Phase 0 is to encompass all 
activities from planning through contract closeout. 
The project reviewed identified OCS planning structures, doctrine, and supporting 
planning platforms that included both acquisition and non-acquisition structures. The 
analysis was completed with a model called the Hybrid Integrative Planning Maturity 
Model built from two published defense oriented contracting models. The Three 
Integrative Pillars for Integrative Success provided a construct to evaluate each 
organizations OCS resources. The Contract Management Maturity Model provided the 
levels of maturity to evaluate planning specific resources.  
1. Personnel:  
Both the Joint and Army operational command’s acquisition personnel were 
found as optimized as contracting units are assigned habitually to supported units. The 
Army Contracting Command’s Brigade supports combatant commands along with the 
Contingency Contracting Battalion (CCBn) supporting major Army Command’s during 
all phases of operations, to include readiness exercises. Joint force non-acquisition 
personnel structures were rated as optimized as multiple structures multi-disciplinary 
OSC Integration Cell, and permanent assignment/availability of the Joint Contracting 
Acquisition Support Office. The Army specific non-acquisition personnel structure was 
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rated as integrated with the creation of the 3C skill identifier embedded into operational 
staff structures, although this function is still being filled and isn’t yet optimized though 
integration with acquisition structures.  
2. Protocols:  
The protocol pillar was found as integrated for both Joint and Army doctrine, as 
the planning doctrine reflects an acknowledgement of both acquisition and non-
acquisition tasks are articulated across staff members. Performance metrics were not 
published, although they may be held within specific combatant commands. JP 4-10 
specifically mentions the assignment of mission specific metrics to the OSCIC, leaving 
optimization and metric creation to each individual combatant command. The primary 
weaknesses of the reviewed protocols include too much literature with varying levels of 
focus ranging from strategic to tactical level. Additionally, a capability gap was identified 
at the operational level planning guidance applicable to initial entry, midsized single 
service missions. 
3. Platforms:  
Within a Joint Forces, and Joint Task Force construction, the platforms pillar is 
rated as optimized reflecting organizational planning incorporating OCS planning factors 
in systems working across staff functions and phases of the operation. The use of formal 
planning structures in a joint task force environment includes Adaptive Planning and 
Execution (APEX) in planning and Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) 
JLLIS. The Army Forces level also utilized a lessons learned platform, while allowing for 
operational level planning resources to incorporate OCS planning factors. Therefore, the 
Army Forces command receives an optimized rating in the HIPMM. 
The above analysis of OCS resources as ranging from integrated to optimized in 
maturity, and appropriate for the services. The military services looking to adapt Army 
and Joint doctrine for their own can use this to guide the level of maturity needed to 
support their decided role within OCS operations. First, services need to decide what 
level guidance is needed based on their unique OCS or contingency contracting role. The 
roles can range from participating in Joint exercises and supporting a lead service effort 
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to allowing operational units the capability to support/augment a contingency with OCS. 
Once the role is decided, developing tasks for single services can use current doctrinal 
planning factors while taking into account the need to incorporate initial entry operations, 
not just Relief-In-Place/ Transfer of Authority factors. Overall, the guidance specific to a 
single service lead operational level mission is scattered among multiple documents and a 
consolidated list of suggestions is in recommendations and findings are described in 
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Single services looking to develop OCS planning function should consider the use 
of an integrator similar to joint and army planning personnel resources. The disparity 
between the two model’s findings is in the staffing approaches to the non-acquisition 
OCS planning function. At the joint task force levels, the use of the embedded JCASO 
office, and the development and use of the OSCIC proves stability and continuity of OCS 
planning focus throughout all the phases. At an operational level, the Army’s OSCO 3C 
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skill identifier also provides credentialed OCS planning assets, although the slots are still 
being worked into the force structure and integration with acquisition staff hasn’t 
occurred. The Army’s acquisition staff may not be co-located with the supported unit’s 
staff, and may not be permanently assigned below the major Army command level. 
Single services could embedded this function with already established staff structures as 
an additional duty. The HIPMM integrated rating reflects an identification of the many 
external stakeholders and OCS planning tasks across staff members. A comprehensive 
view of all tasks could be challenging as the doctrine was varied and the tasks were found 
in multiple documents.  
• Subsidiary question 3: What is the current state of practice in OCS 
and how is it related to single services? 
The current state of OCS practice in the shaping phase was studied through 
evaluating a joint and army training exercise incorporating OCS into the processes. To 
accomplish this, the Yoder Three Tier Model (YTTM) and the HIPMM model (YTTM) 
was used which included a tiered approach to evaluate the maturity of contingency 
contracting planning resources developed outside of doctrine. 
The joint training exercise was rated as optimized in all categories as the JCASO 
staff developed and integrated each function, both acting as the IPE and as the developer 
of metrics related to capturing the efficiency and effectiveness of OCS planning 
solutions. Since the Joint Task Force exercise used all the OCS planning assets, the rating 
from the previous chapter was relevant and acted as a base. Conversely, the Army 
training exercise incorporating OCS was conducted at a tactical level and the ratings were 
lower in maturity. The personnel assets were not permanently assigned, as Army OCS 
personnel assets are assigned to major commands. Several local initiatives improved the 
OCS planning by lengthening the shaping phase and allowing for more than ad-hoc 
execution of OCS planning. Many of the platforms used in planning and lessons learned 
were less robust than the joint task force assets but received the same rating. The use of 
after action reports by a high level IPE provides tiered approach described by the YTTM. 
OCS planning procedures and resources can be adapted successfully at a more tactical 
contingency contracting level. 
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B. FINDINGS AND RECCOMENDATIONS 
1. Finding and Recommendation 1 
Acquisition focused resources and solutions developed during stability operations 
without adequate developing matching non-acquisition resources lead to an imbalance in 
contractor management and planning assets increasing the risk of incurring fraud, waste 
and abuse.  
The recommendation for all services developing contingency contracting 
structures and doctrine is that both acquisition and non-acquisition resources equally 
ensure contractor management and oversight are adequately addressed in operations. 
Institutionalizing OCS with the service’s primary logistics planners should include a brief 
history to understand the context of current doctrine and the importance of this function. 
Graphic representations of these included are a brief history of OCS (see the Appendix, 
or the Commission on Wartime Contracting graphic in Figure 3) and a definition of OCS 
and its subsidiary terms in Figure 2 (Church & Schwartz, 2015). 
Contingency contracting executed at an operational level may be smaller in scope 
than that of a Joint Task Force. Still, understanding how to frame the operational 
environment without an OCSIC, and identify the focal points of contact to leverage a 
business base in a contingency environment are important tasks. 
2. Finding and Recommendation 2 
The current OCS and contingency contracting doctrine appears to address stability 
operations leaving out key aspects of the current operational environment including, 
shaping phase planning factors, initial entry operations, and theater maturity.  
Single services developing tactical and operational level contingency planning 
doctrine include environments: shaping phase planning factors, initial entry operations, 
and theater maturity. This thesis presented a graphic in Figure 24 titled OCS and Theater 
Maturity developed from the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy updated with 
the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy’s course material from MN 3318 
Contingency Contracting. This graphic recognizes that the business environment in a 
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theater includes not only economic concerns, but also the business capacity of the market 
base to work with the United States government.  
Finally, the author recommends consolidating contingency contracting OCS 
planning factors relevant to single services. Some areas to consider: 
Acquisition and non-acquisition Definitions of: inherently governmental 
function, procurement lead time, unauthorized commitment and 
ratifications, effects of contracting on the battlefield, contract support 
timeline, OCS processes and team members, and the importance of phase 
shaping phase activities, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011a, 
p. 2–1).   
Identifying key activities in the contingency contracting shaping phase at 
an operational level to include: Analyze the operational environment, 
develop operational contracting plan, requiring activity preparation and 
integration with contracting staff, lessons learned gathering, sharing and 
archiving. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2–2). 
Defining inherently governmental function considerations to include: 
Direction and control of combat and crisis situations, budgeting, and 
policy decisions. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011b, p. 22). 
3. Finding and Recommendation 3 
The amount of current doctrine and resources are extensive, with each having  
various planning phase focuses. 
Future doctrine should unify and address both acquisition and non-acquisition 
planning factors, to include tactical and operational planning factors, such as contractor 
managing standards, key planning tasks, and metrics to improve future contingency 
contracting efforts at all levels. 
4. Finding and Recommendation 4 
The maturity and integration of Joint OCS operations was much higher than Army 
tactical level contingency contracting. 
Department of the Army doctrine needs to address tactical and operational level 
contingency contracting planning factors and readiness. This can be accomplished by 
establishing standards contractor management levels in all units and creating a common 
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vocabulary and tasks for acquisition and non-acquisition planners supporting contingency 
operations. All levels of OCS and contingency contracting planning require metrics to 
capture efficiency and effectiveness of OCS planning and execution. These metrics can 
support cost-consciousness through contract management metrics and 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Conduct an in-depth analysis of contingency contracting in the execution of a 
single service lead mission including crises action planning into an initial entry 
environment from planning through closure.  
Conduct an in-depth analysis of Operational Contract Support in the execution in 
a Joint Task Force lead mission including crises action planning into an initial entry 
environment from planning through closure. 
A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Department of the Army allowing temporary 
transfers of Multi-Functional Logistic (Quartermaster, Transportation and Ordnance) 
officers into the acquisition corps for an assignment as a contracting officer, 51C. 
Currently, the Army’s Acquisition Corps selects a representative population of all 
branches who comprise the contracting career field.  While Acquisition Corps (50) 
benefits from the inclusion of logisticians into their ranks, the Logistical Corp (90) does 
not have the same reciprocity. Temporary assignment in the Acquisition career field and 
returning to the basic branch would provide the logistics officer experience as the 
contingency contracting support to the requiring activity. This experience can provide a 
new perspective when moved back into the operational and strategic levels of Army 





APPENDIX.  OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT DOCTRINE 
AND THEME MAP 
 Timeline: Wartime Contracting to Operational Contact Support                         Figure 31. 
with Supporting Doctrine 
 
 
This graphic was created by the author to represent the themes in transforming wartime 
contracting to today’s recognized Operational Contract Support framework and the 
supporting doctrine. 
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